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Fallacy 
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This Article introduces the term Corporate Technologies (“CorpTech”) to refer to the use of 
distributed ledgers, smart contracts, Big Data analytics, artificial intelligence and machine 
learning in the corporate context and analyzes the impact of CorpTech on the future of corporate 
boards. We focus on the tech manifestation of agency problems within corporations and 
identify—after considering possible market, governance, and regulatory solutions—elements of 
a governance framework for the CorpTech age.  In particular, we take on a prediction often found 
in the literature, namely that CorpTech has the potential to solve a number of corporate 
governance problems for good and even make boards of directors redundant. We argue that this 
claim is based on what we call the “tech nirvana fallacy,” or the tendency of comparing 
supposedly perfect machines with failure-prone humans. The inherent features of technology and 
corporate governance reveal that even well-programmed CorpTech leaves the core issue of 
corporate governance—conflicts of interest among the relevant corporate stakeholders—
untouched. In the Corptech age, the key question becomes: “is the human being that selects or 
controls the firm’s tech conflicted?” If so, CorpTech itself will be tainted. In fact, the problems 
arising from the transition to a CorpTech-dominated governance environment may, in the short-
term, make things even worse: insufficient understanding of the promise and perils of CorpTech 
and over-confidence therein may even aggravate agency problems within firms.  
 
 †  Luca Enriques is Professor of Corporate Law at the University of Oxford Faculty of Law and Fellow 
of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). 
 †  Dirk Zetzsche is ADA Chair in Financial Law (Inclusive Finance) at the University of Luxembourg 
Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Director of the Centre for Business and Corporate Law, Heinrich-
Heine-University, Düsseldorf, Germany, and an Academic Member of ECGI. The Authors are thankful for 
comments from, and conversations on the topic with, Mark Adams, Nikita Aggarwal, John Armour, Douglas 
Arner, Daniel Awrey, William Birdthistle, Christopher Bruner, Ross Buckley, Michael Burstein, Isabelle 
Corbisier, Horst Eidenmüller, Eilís Ferran, Holger Fleischer, Merritt Fox, Joshua Getzler, Ron Gilson, Matthew 
Jennejohn, Sergio Gramitto Ricci, Jeff Gordon, Andrew Green, David Hiez, Herwig Hoffmann, Edward 
Iacobucci, David Kershaw, Joshua Mitts, Ulrich Noack, Muna Ndulo, Saule Omarova, Edmund-Philipp 
Schuster, Gerald Spindler, Eric Talley, Christiane Wendehorst, Arnold Weinrib, Sam Weinstein, Aaron Wright, 
Charles Yablon, Albert Yoon, as well as participants to presentations and workshops at Bocconi University, 
Cardozo Law School, Columbia Law School, Consob, Cornell Law School, the Center for International 
Governance Research, Harvard Law School, the Ibero-American Institute for Law and Finance, the London 
School of Economics, the University of Luxembourg, Monash University, the National University of Singapore, 
the University of Chicago-Kent, University College London, the University of Oxford, the Sorbonne, the 
University of Sydney Law School, the University of Toronto, the Technical University of Munich and Yale Law 
School. Moritz Spenke and Pamela Cela provided valuable research assistance. Usual disclaimers apply. 
56 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:55 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 58 
I.  THE PROMISE OF CORPTECH......................................................................... 62 
A.  DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS, BLOCKCHAINS, AND SMART  
CONTRACTS ................................................................................... 62 
1.  The Technologies ...................................................................... 62 
2.  DLT-Based CorpTech Solutions ............................................... 64 
B.  BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE  
LEARNING ...................................................................................... 65 
1.  The Technologies ...................................................................... 65 
2.  AI-Based CorpTech .................................................................. 66 
II.  CORPTECH’S IMPACT: THE END OF THE BOARD AS WE KNOW IT? ............. 68 
A.  OBSOLESCENT BOARDS? .................................................................. 68 
1.  Real-Time Accounting and “Full Transparency” .................... 68 
2.  More Direct Shareholder Influence .......................................... 69 
B.  TOWARDS ALGO-BOARDS? .............................................................. 70 
III.  THE DEMISE OF THE BOARD AS A TECH NIRVANA FALLACY ..................... 71 
A.  BOARDS’ CORE FUNCTIONS ............................................................. 71 
1.  The Monitoring Board .............................................................. 72 
2.  The Mediating Board ................................................................ 74 
B.  AUTOMATION OF MONITORING AS THE SOLUTION? ......................... 74 
1.  IT Limitations ........................................................................... 75 
a.  Data Dependency ............................................................... 75 
b.  Conflicts with Human Ethics .............................................. 78 
c.  Inferior Handling of Incomplete Law ................................. 78 
2.  Governance’s Inherent Traits ................................................... 79 
a.  The Incomplete Corporate Contract ................................... 79 
b.  Conflicts of Interest ............................................................ 80 
c.  Information Flows .............................................................. 82 
C.  THE BOARD DISINTERMEDIATION HYPOTHESIS ............................... 82 
1.   Governance’s Inherent Features ............................................. 83 
a.  Information Asymmetries to Persist ................................... 83 
b.  Passive and Closet Index Funds: Collective Action 
Problems to Persist ........................................................... 84 
c.  Active Investing and Shareholder Activism: Less  
or More? ............................................................................ 86 
d.  Shareholder Dialogue with Conflicted Managers  
Less Fruitful ...................................................................... 88 
2.  IT Limitations ........................................................................... 88 
D.  INTERMEDIATE RESULTS: UTOPIA RECONSIDERED.......................... 90 
IV.  A GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR THE CORPTECH AGE .......................... 91 
A.  PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION? .................................................. 91 
November 2020] CORPORATE TECHNOLOGIES 57 
B.  BEST PRACTICES: EXPANDING THE BOARD COMMITTEES’  
REMIT TO CORPTECH OVERSIGHT ................................................. 92 
C.  THE CASE AGAINST CORPTECH REGULATION ................................. 95 
D.  ENHANCING CORPTECH-RELATED DISCLOSURES ........................... 96 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 97 
  
58 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:55 
INTRODUCTION 
In one of the largest financial scandals to date, Wells Fargo, the United 
States’ largest bank by number of employees, admitted to the opening of some 
3.5 million deposit and credit card accounts without consumer knowledge, 
leading to fabricated quarterly earnings and a boost to the Wells Fargo stock 
price. The scandal resulted in a dozen U.S. Senate and House Committee 
hearings, various U.S. and state regulators’ inquiries, penalties and fines 
exceeding $4.5 billion in total costs to date, an unprecedented “asset cap” 
imposed on Wells Fargo in early 2018 for “widespread consumer abuses,” a 
fundamental revamp of Wells Fargo’s compensation, compliance and risk-
management system, forfeiture of CEO pay, and the departure of several 
executives, including three CEOs within three years.1 The Wells Fargo scandal 
is the latest reminder of how, almost ninety years after Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means’s seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private Property,2 the 
mechanisms to ensure that agents within corporations perform their tasks and 
duties in line with the long-term interests of their shareholders (and other 
stakeholders, as the case may be3), rather than pursuing their immediate self-
interest, are far from fail-proof.4  
If laws, best practices, ethical standards, and market pressures have so far 
been unable to tackle this core corporate governance challenge, perhaps 
 
 1. See Press Release, Josh Shapiro, Att’y Gen., Off. of the Att’y Gen., Commonwealth of Pa., Attorney 
General Shapiro Announces $57 Million 50-State Settlement with Wells Fargo for Opening Unauthorized 
Accounts and Charging Consumers for Unnecessary Auto Insurance, Mortgage Fees  (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/press-releases/attorney-general-shapiro-announces-575-
million-50-state-settlement-with-wells-fargo-bank-for-opening-unauthorized-accounts-and-charging-
consumers-for-unnecessary-auto-insurance-mortgage-fees/ (detailing misconduct sanctioned as well as 
penalties, fines and settlement costs until end of 2018 of $ 3 billion); see also Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Takes 
$1.6 Billion Hit Linked to Fake-Account Scandal, CNN (Oct. 15, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/ 
10/15/investing/wells-fargo-earnings-scandal/index.html (detailing additional inquiries, sanctions and penalties 
through Oct. 25, 2019). 
 2. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY  (1933). 
 3. While the prevailing U.S. corporate governance view has long expected management to focus on 
wealth creation for shareholders only, things have changed in recent years, as shown, for instance, by the letter 
from Larry Fink, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the world’s largest asset manager, Blackrock, to the 
CEOs of U.S. listed companies. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO, BlackRock, to CEOs (2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (“To prosper over time, 
every company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution 
to society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and 
the communities in which they operate.”). Multistakeholderism may be understood as the new mainstream. Yet, 
we will mainly keep our focus here on shareholders for two reasons. First, they are a key constituency with a 
well-established role in companies’ internal governance, given their (hitherto exclusive) power to appoint 
directors. Second, while not undisputed, the principle under Delaware law is that directors, in the words of Leo 
Strine, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, have a “legal obligation to make—within the 
constraints of other positive law—the promotion of stockholder welfare their end.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., The 
Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure 
Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 764 (2015). 
 4. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 passim (1976) (outlining the concept of managerial agency 
costs and their implications for corporate governance). 
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technology can. Would algorithms and machines, with their more powerful, 
disinterested, and unbiased information-processing capacity, be better at 
monitoring corporate agents?  
Breathtaking advancements in information technology (IT) are 
characterizing the twenty-first century, from big data analytics,5 artificial 
intelligence (AI), and machine learning6 to distributed ledger technology, 
including blockchains7 and smart contracts.8 Many expect these technologies, 
which we collectively refer to as “CorpTech,” to prompt fundamental changes 
in the law9 as well as in corporate governance.10  
CorpTech comprises all solutions relating to corporate governance, 
including tools to set executive compensation, identify candidates for top 
positions within the organization, facilitate investor relations, corporate voting, 
and the internal workings of the board of directors, manage risk, and enhance 
compliance functions.11 However, as used here, the term does not extend to 
operations software products such as those used for sales, research and 
development (R&D), and production management.12 
With regard to corporate governance, scholars have speculated as to the 
possible use of the new technologies to improve discrete corporate practices, 
such as shareholder identification,13 shareholder proposals, proxy fights,14 
electronic voting, virtual shareholder meetings,15 digitalized compliance and 
 
 5. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 
677–93 (2016) (describing big data analytics). 
 6. See, e.g., Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 U. WASH. L. REV. 87, 102–10 (2014) 
(discussing progress on AI research and how it may affect the practice of the law). 
 7. See, e.g., Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas W. Arner, The Distributed Liability of 
Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1370–74 (2018) (introducing the concept 
of distributed ledgers); PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF 
CODE 13–57 (2018) (describing blockchains). 
 8. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 263, 273–78 (2017) (analyzing features of smart contracts); see also Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, 
Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 320–24, 367–81 (2017) (describing smart contracts).  
 9. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 
1043–52 (2015) (arguing that securities regulation must be adapted to FinTech). 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. CorpTech differs from RegTech. The latter is the use of technology in the context of risk management, 
compliance, reporting, and regulatory oversight. It thus overlaps with CorpTech only in part—in other words, 
in its component relating to risk management oversight and compliance. See, e.g., Douglas W. Arner, Jànos 
Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 377–84 (2017). 
 12. Importantly, though, the boundaries between CorpTech and operations technology will necessarily be 
hazy, since effective CorpTech requires integration into the rest of a firm’s information systems. For instance, 
in the Wells Fargo case, the fraud originated in the bank’s retail sales department. See supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. Effective CorpTech oversight would have required access to fraud indicators available only 
on the operations level.  
 13. See, e.g., George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 238–53 
(2018); see also  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 219, 224 (allowing for the use of the blockchain to maintain corporate 
share registries).  
 14. See, e.g., Geis, supra note 13, at 272–73. 
 15. See, e.g., Michael D. Goldman & Eileen M. Filliben, Corporate Governance: Current Trends and 
Likely Developments for the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 689, 695 (2000); Anne Lafarre & 
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risk management,16 as well as to the impact of these new technologies on the 
corporate purpose.17 Attention has also been focused on an arguably fringe 
phenomenon, algorithmic entities, or “self-driving corporations,” whereby 
humans relinquish control over the corporation to an algorithm.18 Others have 
delved into discrete legal questions arising from the use of AI to assist, if not 
replace, boards in their decision-making functions,19 and into the related 
question of whether algorithms may themselves (and should be allowed to) serve 
as board members.20  
Still others have speculated as to how new technologies will reshape 
corporate governance more broadly. These scholars, whom we refer to as “tech 
proponents,” share the view that technology will fundamentally change existing 
corporate governance paradigms and may even eradicate long-standing 
corporate governance problems.21 From their perspective, technology is the 
solution to the ultimate challenge in corporate governance, namely, how to deal 
with the inherent imperfections of (human) corporate agents, including their 
dogged self-interestedness and pervasive biases.22  Multiple corporate scandals 
 
Christoph Van der Elst, Blockchain Technology for Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism 15 (Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 390/2018, 2018); Christoph Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre, 
Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 111, 128 (2019); 
Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. ONLINE 1, 18–19 (2017). 
 16. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 722–38 (2010) (discussing the governance implications of digitalized compliance and risk 
management). 
 17. See, e.g., Christopher Bruner, Distributed Ledgers, Artificial Intelligence, and the Purpose of the 
Corporation, CAMBRIDGE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 19) (on file with authors) (arguing that the 
core issues of corporate purpose remain unchanged by technology). 
 18. See Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1485, 1495–1500 (2014) (discussing algorithmic entities, corporations with no members, no directors 
and running merely on software); Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 901–06 
(2018) (discussing the perils of algorithmic entities); see also John Armour & Horst Eidenmüller, Self-Driving 
Corporations?, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 87, 105–14 (2020) (developing a conceptual framework for self-driving 
corporations and highlighting regulatory challenges). 
 19. See Max Bankewitz, Carl Åberg & Christine Teuchert, Digitalization and Boards of Directors: A New 
Era of Corporate Governance?, 5 BUS. & MGMT. RSCH. 58, 63–64 (2016) (predicting that, under the influence 
of digitalization, boards will become “virtual networks of people” with diminished needs to monitor 
management). 
 20. See Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Artificial Agents in Corporate Boardrooms, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 
869, 892–902 (2020) (discussing AI algorithms taking the functions of board members under Delaware law and 
arguing that the Roman law for slaves may offer a model for its legal treatment); Martin Petrin, Corporate 
Management in the Age of AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 965, 1002–06 (predicting the advent of AI directors). 
This is of course part of the broader debate on humans’ race against the machines. See generally ANDREW 
MCAFEE & ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE (2011) (detailing the replacement of human 
labor by computers); Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible 
Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254 (2017) (making predictions about 
the same).  
 21. See infra Part II.  
 22. See, for example, Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 237, 248–85 (2009) with specific reference to the corporate board setting. 
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(from Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s23 to Wells Fargo24) bear 
testimony to the pernicious consequences that the wrong corporate governance 
arrangements can have on shareholders and other stakeholders alike. If 
automated solutions become available that will finally keep corporate agents on 
a tight leash without unduly constraining their ability to create value, then we 
might be on the verge of a new era in which corporations, liberated from the 
negative influence of agent opportunism, can become even more formidable 
engines for growth and prosperity. 
Tempting as it may be to set up perfect machines against failure-prone 
humans (what we call the “tech nirvana fallacy”),25 a better understanding of 
both the available technology and the enduring role of humans in its design and 
deployment justifies a soberer assessment of technology’s impact on corporate 
governance. In providing this assessment, our Article provides the conceptual 
groundwork for a sound governance framework in an age where humans and 
machines interact.  
In order to do so, our Article argues that the conflicts of interest and 
information asymmetries that have always characterized corporate governance 
seep into the code of CorpTech applications. The allocation of power over the 
selection of particular CorpTech solutions will determine the degree of control 
that any constituency (directors, management, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders) can exert over the firm. We also dismiss as unrealistic the idea that 
shareholders (let alone other stakeholders) may disintermediate boards and 
monitor management directly themselves. Boards will continue to perform their 
core monitoring and mediation functions for the predictable future. Yet, we 
acknowledge that CorpTech, and hence adaption of corporate governance to 
CorpTech, is ever more important for the functioning of corporate boards.  
On this basis, we lay out the pillars of a governance framework designed 
to steer the cooperation between humans and machines in the CorpTech age: 
boards should extend their monitoring functions by extending the remit of 
existing committees to CorpTech oversight or by establishing tech committees 
with the same task. We also make the case for mandatory disclosure of 
CorpTech-related corporate governance arrangements. 
 
 23. In the Enron and WorldCom cases, executives had not only misled their boards of directors and audit 
committees on high-risk accounting practices, but also successfully pressured their audit firm (soon-to-be 
defunct Arthur Andersen) to ignore the issues. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule 
Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 302 (2004); CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & 
KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 47–67 (2008) (discussing the Enron scandal). 
 24. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 25. The nirvana fallacy refers to the misconception, common among legal scholars, of comparing the real 
world, with its market imperfections, with a failproof, perfectly regulated one. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1272 (1982). The economist Harold Demsetz first 
identified this fallacy, albeit without coining the term “nirvana fallacy” himself. Harold Demsetz, Information 
and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1969) (introducing the “nirvana approach,” 
described above, as being susceptible to three common fallacies: the grass is always greener fallacy, the fallacy 
of the free lunch, and the people could be different fallacy). 
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We conclude that, while CorpTech may speed up procedures and 
governance practices may include a greater degree of code deployment and data 
analytics, CorpTech will not make the corporate boards’ core functions obsolete, 
barring technological breakthroughs that eventually displace human judgment 
in corporate decision-making processes entirely. So long as humans yield 
influence over the firm, the question of who decides what code is deployed and 
what data is processed will be key, and traditional corporate governance 
mechanisms will retain their core function of curbing agency problems within 
the firm. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the technical context of 
our analysis.  Part II presents the tech proponents’ view that CorpTech solutions 
will supplant the monitoring board, while shareholder direct involvement will 
make the mediating board obsolete. Part III counters these claims, arguing that 
conflicts of interest are bound to remain at the heart of corporate governance.  
Who selects the CorpTech for the firm will determine whose interests CorpTech 
products will cater to. Part IV develops the elements of a CorpTech-dominated 
governance framework designed to address corporate governance challenges in 
the CorpTech age. Part V concludes. 
I.  THE PROMISE OF CORPTECH 
This Part briefly describes the technologies that are affecting, or are likely 
to affect, the functions typically associated with corporate boards: distributed 
ledgers, blockchains, and smart contracts (Part I.A); and big data analytics, 
artificial intelligence, and machine learning (Part I.B).  
A.  DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS, BLOCKCHAINS, AND SMART CONTRACTS 
1.  The Technologies 
A distributed ledger is “a database that is consensually shared and 
synchronized across networks spread across multiple sites, institutions, or 
geographies, allowing transactions to have [multiple private or] public 
‘witnesses.’”26 The data sharing results in a sequential database distributed 
across a network of servers all of which together function as a ledger.27  
Distributed ledgers are characterized by an absence or minimal presence of 
central administration and no centralized data storage. They are, hence, 
“distributed,” in the sense that the authorization for the recording of a given 
piece of information results from the software-driven interaction of multiple 
participants. Coupled with cryptographic solutions, such features (decentrali-
 
 26. OLIVER WYMAN, WORLD ECON. F., INNOVATION-DRIVEN CYBER-RISK TO CUSTOMER DATA IN 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 6 (2017), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Cyber_Risk_to_Customer_Data.pdf. 
 27. DAVID MILLS, KATHY WANG, BRENDAN MALONE, ANJANA RAVI, JEFF MARQUARDT, CLINTON CHEN, 
ANTON BADEV, TIMOTHY BREZINSKI, LINDA FAHY, KIMBERLEY LIAO, VANESSA KARGENIAN, MAX 
ELLITHORPE, WENDY NG & MARIA BAIRD, FED. RSRV. BD., DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2016-095, DISTRIBUTED 
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN PAYMENTS, CLEARING, AND SETTLEMENT 10–11 (2016), https://doi.org/10. 
17016/FEDS.2016.095. 
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zation and distribution across a network of computers) curtail the risk of data 
manipulation, thereby solving the problem of trusting third parties— 
specifically, data storage service providers.28 
The modus operandi of distributed ledgers is best understood by 
contrasting them with traditional electronic ledgers where data is stored under 
the administration of a single entity. The latter entail a number of risks. First, if 
the hardware where the register is “located” is destroyed, the information 
contents and the authority to ascertain that they are correct are lost. Second, an 
unfaithful administrator (or disloyal employees, as the case may be) may 
manipulate the information stored in the register. Third, a cyber-attack may 
result in manipulations and data losses.29 
Distributed ledgers address these problems by raising the barrier for 
manipulation. The underlying technology requires consensus of many data 
storage points (“nodes”). If there are n nodes (instead of one concentrated 
ledger) and e describes the effort necessary to break into any single server, all 
other conditions being equal (safety per server etc.), the effort necessary to 
manipulate all the linked servers will be n x e rather than 1 x e.  
Distributed ledgers are usually paired with a blockchain protocol.30  
Blockchain refers to the storage of all data parts as data bundles (the “blocks”) 
in a strict time-related series which links each block, through a time stamp, to 
the previous and subsequent blocks. The blockchain renders data corruption 
even harder, because a successful cyberattack would require simultaneously 
corrupting not just one, but multiple sets of data (that is, the whole blockchain) 
as well as the time stamps.  
Distributed ledgers have provided fertile ground for the application of 
another innovation that may solve the problem of trust in human interactions: 
smart contracts.31 While neither smart, nor contracts, they are in fact self-
executing software protocols that reflect the terms of an agreement between two 
parties.32  The conditions of the agreement are written directly into lines of code.  
Smart contracts permit the execution of transactions between disparate, 
 
 28. See MICHÈLE FINCK, BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 12–14 (2019); see also 
Sinclair Davidson, Primavera De Filippi & Jason Potts, Blockchains and the Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 639, 641 (2018) (arguing that blockchain technology is a new 
governance institution that competes with other economic institutions of capitalism, namely firms, markets, 
networks, and even governments); DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 55, 136–40 (arguing that widespread 
deployment of the blockchain will lead to tech-based business practices that could prompt a loss in importance 
of centralized authorities, such as government, and urging a more active regulatory approach).  
 29. Any server can be manipulated with sufficient computing power and time (even if no other weakness 
in an encryption system is known to the attackers). See JEAN-PHILIPPE AUMASSON, SERIOUS CRYPTOGRAPHY: A 
PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ENCRYPTION 10–18, 40–48 (2018).  
 30. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 33–58; see also Zetzsche et al., supra note 7, at 1372. 
 31. See Sklaroff, supra note 8, at 272–75; see also Werbach & Cornell, supra note 8, at 332–33. 
 32. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2017); 
Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 
35, 36 (2014); Karen E.C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and the 
Social Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 1, 5–6 (2017); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 8, at 
313. 
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anonymous parties without the need for an external enforcement mechanism 
(such as a court, an arbitrator, or a central clearing facility). They render 
transactions traceable, transparent, and irreversible. Since processes driven by 
smart contracts are often saved on distributed ledgers, we refer to these three 
technologies (distributed ledgers, blockchains, and smart contracts) collectively 
as “distributed ledger technologies” (“DLTs”). 
2.  DLT-Based CorpTech Solutions 
DLTs have the potential of altering the way companies are directed and 
controlled.33  Notable experiments centering around shareholder voting support 
this prediction. For instance, Fidelity Investments, the world’s fourth-largest 
asset manager, has developed SOCOACT, a blockchain-based voting system 
designed to authenticate voters and ensure fair corporate voting processes.34  
Computershare, a provider of share-registers-as-a-service, tabulation services, 
and technical vote processing at shareholder meetings, has teamed up with 
SETL, a provider of blockchain-based central securities depositary services, in 
an effort to establish the world’s first blockchain-based immutable register of 
securities ownership.35 Broadridge, whose business includes managing the 
information flows between the institutional investor holding the shares and the 
issuer,36 obtained a patent to utilize the Ethereum blockchain for proxy voting 
and share repurchases37 following a trial with J.P. Morgan, Northern Trust, and 
Banco Santander.38    
Similarly, Northern Trust, one of the largest and oldest U.S. banks, has 
developed a blockchain solution for board meetings in cooperation with 
technology giant IBM.39 The package includes two smart contracts that record 
meeting attendance by collecting biometric information from the various devices 
 
 33. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Niron Hashai, Eugene Kandel & Yishay Yafeh, Technological Progress and 
the Future of the Corporation, 6 J. BRITISH ACAD. 215, 225 (2018) (arguing that, because DLTs reduce fraud 
and enhance trust, they have the potential to displace “powerful intermediaries”). But see Iris H-Y Chiu & Ernest 
W.K. Lim, Technology vs Ideology: How Far Will Artificial Intelligence and Distributed Ledger Technology 
Transform Corporate Governance and Business?, 18 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (arguing that 
DLT merely increases efficiency of corporate governance processes). 




 35. See Press Release, SETL, Computershare and SETL Demonstrate Australia’s First Working 
Blockchain Solution, https://www.setl.io/blog/computershare-and-setl-demonstrate-australia-s-first-working-
blockchain-solution (Sept. 25, 2019).  
 36. On custodian chains, see, for example, Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of 
Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1236–48 (2008).  
 37. Press Release, Broadridge, Broadridge Secures Industry-Leading Blockchain Patent for Proxy 
Processing and Repo Agreements (May 10, 2018), https://www.broadridge.com/press-release/2018/broadridge-
secures-industry-leading-blockchain-patent.   
 38. Pete Rizzo, Broadridge Completes Blockchain Proxy Voting Trial, COINDESK (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://www.coindesk.com/broadridge-blockchain-proxy-voting-jpmorgan-santander. 
 39. Christine Kim, Northern Trust Wins Patent for Storing Meeting Minutes on a Blockchain, COINDESK 
(June 6, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/northern-trust-wins-patent-storing-meeting-minutes-blockchain. 
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an attendee may carry and all other pertinent information about the meeting.40 It 
also converts all such information into meeting minutes, following a 
standardized format.41 A third smart contract posts the minutes of the meeting 
and associated documents in a pre-determined repository.42  This allows meeting 
attendance and individual contributions to be instantaneously stored in a 
predetermined and searchable format.  
Developments such as these have stimulated the tech proponents’ 
optimism that DLT applications could also tackle a particularly thorny area of 
corporate governance: executive compensation. Specifically, smart contracts 
could be used to make compensation arrangements harder to alter in 
opportunistic ways further down the road, a phenomenon known as 
“backdating.”43 More generally, it has been suggested that, instead of relying on 
(potentially) conflicted compensation consultants and their own (often self-
serving) biases,44 boards could use smart contracts to determine compensation 
packages.45  To the best of our knowledge, though, there is no publicly available 
evidence that any such product has yet been developed. 
A.  BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND MACHINE LEARNING 
1.  The Technologies 
Big data analytics refers to the collection and processing of data sets that 
are either too large or too complex for traditional data processing applications to 
handle.46 Big data applications look at the bulk of data points and apply 
advanced data analytics methods to detect unexpected correlations, test expected 
correlations for causation, or determine the probability of a predefined pattern.47  
AI assists in putting the big data gathered to good use by drawing 
conclusions as to the probability of an event from prior knowledge of conditions 
related to the event; the greater the volume of data, the more insightful and 
 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.   
 42. Id.   
 43. David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 8–9 (2017). For an account 
of the option backdating scandal, see, for example, Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 858–64 (2008). 
 44. On the role of compensation consultants, compare Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay 
and “Independent” Compensation Consultants, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 247, 247–62 (2010) (finding evidence for 
higher recommended levels of CEO pay when executive compensation consultants “cross-sell” services, but also 
(somewhat counterintuitively) that board pay is higher when consultants work for the board rather than for 
executives), with Christopher S. Armstrong, Christopher D. Ittner & David F. Larcker, Corporate Governance, 
Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels, 17 REV. ACCT. STUD. 322, 322–51 (2012) (finding that 
differences in governance quality explain much of the higher pay in clients of compensation consultants, while 
there is no support for claims that potentially “conflicted” consultants result in higher CEO pay). 
 45. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229. 
 46. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 123–149 (2013). 
 47. See id. at 6. 
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accurate the inferences drawn from them.48 The baseline of AI is a computer that 
mimics human cognitive functions, such as “learning” and “problem solving.”49 
Machine learning is a subset of AI that uses statistical, data-based methods to 
progressively improve the performance of computers on a given task, without 
humans reprogramming the computer system to achieve enhanced 
performance.50 In practice, the learning is achieved through extensive “practice” 
with multiple feedback rounds through which the machine is told whether it has 
passed or failed a task.51 
2.  AI-Based CorpTech 
Due to their superior performance in data gathering and processing, big 
data analytics, AI, and machine learning (hereinafter, referred to together as 
“AI”) can be expected to affect all operational as well as internal control matters, 
from strategy setting to risk management and compliance.52  While humans tend 
to use core, salient data for decisions, technology can consider also seemingly 
unrelated data.  
Importantly for risk management, as humans tend to forget, technology can 
handle data of the past as effectively as data of the present. To the extent that 
accessibility of data of the past by humans (that is, memory) declines, 
management of the risk related to those data unduly becomes of secondary 
importance. 
AI-based early detection and subsequent mitigation of non-compliance 
should prove particularly valuable in reducing liabilities, penalties, and fines, 
the magnitude of which has starkly increased in the last decade.53 
 
 48. See STUART J. RUSSEL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 495–99 
(photo. reprt. 2016) (3d ed. 2009).  
 49. Id. at viii, 1–4 (defining AI as devices that perceive their environment and take actions that maximize 
their chances of successfully achieving their task and describing the origin of the term AI in the Turing Test 
where “a computer passes the test if a human interrogator, after posing some written questions, cannot tell 
whether the written responses come from a person or from a computer,” and defining six core capabilities that 
together compose most of AI, including natural language processing, knowledge representation, automated 
reasoning, machine learning, computer vision, and robotics). The seminal work on AI is, of course, A.M. Turing, 
Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950). 
 50. RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 48, at 693–859 (describing the training methods).  
 51. Id. at 495–99.  
 52. See Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 99 (while “strategic questions considered at the C-suite 
level” are unlikely to justify machine learning analysis, given the insufficiency of available data, “external 
generic data can be used to assist in scenario planning”); see also Saqib Aziz & Michael Dowling, Machine 
Learning and AI for Risk Management, in DISRUPTING FINANCE: FINTECH AND STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
33, 34 (Theo Lynn, John G. Mooney, Pierangelo Rosati & Mark Cummins eds., 2019) (risk management); 
Bamberger, supra note 16, at 690–93, 701–02 (compliance). 
 53. For instance, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission has approved a fine of approximately $5 billion 
against Facebook for mishandling users’ personal information. Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine 
of About $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebook-
ftc-fine.html. In 2017, German car manufacturer Volkswagen admitted to having manipulated emissions data 
for cars manufactured for the U.S. markets, resulting, so far, in penalties and damages of $19 billion. See Press 
Release, DOJ, Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six 
Volkswagen Executives and Employees Are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions 
November 2020] CORPORATE TECHNOLOGIES 67 
Technology is also said to be unbiased,54 albeit in the limited sense that 
technology does not follow its own agenda and is not itself subject to humans’ 
cognitive biases.55 In particular, by airing unconventional and (fact-based) 
contrarian views, machines could neutralize two related group dynamics that 
seriously hamper boards’ effectiveness, namely, “groupthink”56 and the strong 
social pressure against the expression of dissent in boardrooms.57   
An oft-cited example of the early adoption of AI to improve board 
decision-making dynamics involved Hong Kong-based venture capital firm 
Deep Knowledge Ventures, which assigned a (sort of) board position to an AI 
software named VITAL.58 VITAL is designed to conduct due diligence on 
potential investments with a view to identifying overhyped projects, thereby 
protecting the firm from investing in trendy, but overpriced, startups.59 
Better use of internal and external data will also improve intra-firm 
monitoring, which in turn should result in reduced agency costs60 and allow for 
flatter organizational structures.61  
In particular, AI and big data analytics could improve the design and 
steering effects of compensation packages. Equilar Inc., a provider of tech 
solutions for board recruiting, executive compensation, and shareholder 
engagement, provides an early example. Using publicly available compensation 
disclosures, performance targets, and performance data, Equilar’s applications 
generate “pay-for-performance” scores that can be used to determine whether an 
executive is over- or under-paid relative to executives of similarly situated 
companies.62  
 
Tests (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-
criminal-and-civil-penalties-six.  
 54. See Gramitto Ricci, supra note 20, at 877 n.28, 901, 903; see also Petrin, supra note 20, at 1005. 
 55. But see, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 692 (describing the risk that decisionmakers mask their 
intentions by using biased data). See also infra notes 124–133 and accompanying text. 
 56. On groupthink, see generally IRVING JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK (1972). 
 57. Akshaya Kamalnath, The Perennial Quest for Board Independence: Artificial Intelligence to the 
Rescue?, 83 ALB. L. REV. 43, 52 (2020); JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, 
PROMISES BROKEN 61–62 (2008) (describing the pressure to conform to social norms of collegiality and 
cooperation within boardrooms). 
 58. Gramitto Ricci, supra note 20, at 871; Michal S. Gal, Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice, 
25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 59, 61 (2018); Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 88.  
 59. Deep Knowledge Venture’s [sic] Appoints Intelligent Investment Analysis Software VITAL as Board 
Member, GLOBALNEWSWIRE (May 13, 2014), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2014/05/ 
13/635881/10081467/en/Deep-Knowledge-Venture-s-Appoints-Intelligent-Investment-Analysis-Software-
VITAL-as-Board-Member.html. 
 60. See Nicholas Bloom, Luis Garicano, Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, The Distinct Effects of 
Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2859 passim 
(2014) (finding evidence that better information technologies are associated with more autonomy and a wider 
control span).  
 61. Philippe Aghion, Benjamin F. Jones & Charles I. Jones, Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth, 
in THE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN AGENDA 237, 264–66 (Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans & Avi 
Goldfarb eds., 2019). 
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II.  CORPTECH’S IMPACT: THE END OF THE BOARD AS WE KNOW IT? 
Since Melvin Eisenberg’s seminal book, The Structure of the Corporation, 
corporate law scholars posit that a monitoring board is necessary to keep self-
interested managers at bay and to ensure that shareholder interests are catered 
to.63  Corporate governance practices at U.S. listed companies have increasingly 
conformed to such a scholarly approach.64  
Tech proponents argue that shareholders will no longer need boards to 
monitor managers because shareholders will be able to do the monitoring 
themselves.65  For the same reason, there will be no need for boards to mediate 
between the company’s management on the one hand and shareholders on the 
other.66  Finally, because humans are not prepared for the challenges presented 
by tech developments, they may even be replaced, partially or fully, by 
CorpTech automata.67 
We lay out the tech proponents’ view in the following two ways.  First, we 
relay their argument that CorpTech will diminish the need for a monitoring and 
mediating board (Part II.A). Second, we present the view that the remaining 
board tasks can be achieved more efficiently by CorpTech algorithms (Part II.B). 
A.  OBSOLESCENT BOARDS? 
1.  Real-Time Accounting and “Full Transparency” 
According to tech proponents, the days of information asymmetry between 
firms’ insiders and outsiders are numbered: real-time accounting will replace 
traditional accounting and firms will voluntarily post their ordinary business 
transactions on a blockchain accessible to the public.68 In David Yermack’s 
words, thanks to DLTs “[a]nyone could aggregate the firm’s transactions into 
the form of an income statement and balance sheet at any time, and investors 
would no longer need to rely on quarterly financial statements prepared by the 
firm and its auditors.”69 Based on the assumption that technology will eventually 
lead to proprietary information being shared with investors and other market 
participants, tech proponents argue that full transparency will increase 
shareholder trust in the integrity of a corporation’s data and render costly audits 
 
%3D50%2526s1%3D%25252220130159067%252522.PGNR.%2526OS%3DDN%2F20130159067%2526RS
%3DDN%2F20130159067 (detailing the algorithms and data sources used for calculating the score).  
 63. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 156–85 
(1976).  
 64. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1518–40 (2007) (highlighting how the 
monitoring board model has prevailed in the U.S. in the decades following Melvin Eisenberg’s influential work). 
 65. See infra Part II.A. 
 66. On the mediating function of boards, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 269–82 (1999) (arguing that the corporation is a “mediating 
hierarchy” of partially contradicting interests and that the board’s core function is to balance those interests to 
the benefit of the firm). 
 67. See infra Part II.B. 
 68. Yermack, supra note 43, at 18, 24–25. 
 69. Id. at 24. 
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by potentially corrupt professional firms useless.70  In turn, greater transparency, 
coupled with enhanced post-trade efficiency, will reduce transaction costs and 
improve liquidity in capital markets.71 
Ultimately, tech proponents expect lower agency costs arising in 
connection with the selection of directors and executives,72 accrued earnings 
management,73 related party transactions,74 and management compensation 
systems.75 This should vanquish the need for boards to focus on such issues.76  
2.  More Direct Shareholder Influence 
The optimism regarding enhanced transparency is not limited to 
accounting information but extends to transparency of ownership,77 prompting 
the view that DLT-induced transparency could replace mandatory disclosure of 
beneficial ownership and prevent empty voting.78  
More generally, according to Yermack, DLTs have the potential of 
“dramatically affect[ing] the balance of power between directors, managers, and 
shareholders.”79 Greater transparency on trading and ownership data may erode 
profit opportunities for active traders, shareholder activists, and raiders, while 
the (supposed) increased liquidity of a blockchain-based market would reduce 
the costs of selling and may therefore lead to more emphasis being placed on 
exit (trading) as opposed to voice (voting).80 This would reduce the importance 
 
 70. Id. at 24–25; Vedat Akgiray, Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Blockchain Technology and 
Corporate Governance, at 24–25, Doc. No. DAF/CA/CG/RD(2018)1/REV1 (June 6, 2018); see also Reyes et 
al., supra note 15, at 18–21 (albeit more cautiously as to the whether such a setup is desirable). 
 71. Yermack, supra note 43, at 18. 
 72. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229; Kamalnath, supra note 57, passim; see Isil Erel, Léa H. Stern, 
Chenhao Tan & Michael S. Weisbach, Selecting Directors Using Machine Learning 34 (Eur. Corp. Governance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 605/2019, 2019) (describing an experiment with algorithms to make out-of-sample 
predictions of director performance, using shareholder approval rates as well as firm returns and profitability as 
proxies, testing the quality of these predictions, and concluding that “[m]achine learning holds promise for 
understanding the process by which governance structures are chosen, and has potential to help real-world firms 
improve their governance”).  
 73. Yermack, supra note 43, at 25. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229; Yermack, supra note 43, at 20–21. Yermack also notes that 
blockchain trading of a company’s shares may reduce the effectiveness of equity-based management incentives: 
assuming that part of management’s compensation is legal insider trading (that is, trading in compliance with 
insider trading laws), he predicts real-time transparency to prompt less active managerial trading out of concern 
of sending adverse signals to the market. Yermack, supra note 43, at 20–21. In turn, if management profits less 
from legal insider trading, firms might have to pay management more to offset their foregone gains. Id. 
 76. Yermack, supra note 43, at 20–21, 25; Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229.  
 77. Geis, supra note 13, at 255–62 (discussing distributed ledgers and blockchain for creating traceable 
shares in the clearing and settlement system); id. at 267–69 (arguing that traceable shares lead to a fully 
transparent “centralized ledger of owners”). 
 78. Yermack, supra note 43, at 24 (arguing that the tech-based increase in transparency will render empty 
voting more difficult). Empty voting refers to the exercise of shareholder voting rights without the underlying 
economic interest. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 828–36 (2006).  
 79. Yermack, supra note 43, at 9. 
 80. Id. at 19–20. 
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of the board as a mediator among shareholder constituencies with diverging 
interests. 
At the same time, a private distributed ledger recording shareholder voting 
could increase speed and accuracy, thereby reducing voting costs and increasing 
shareholder participation.81  
The blockchain also allows for decentralized, virtual-only shareholder 
meetings,82 which may induce shareholders to demand votes on a wider range 
of topics and with greater frequency than they do today.  All in all, the advent of 
CorpTech would justify the opening of “a debate for a new equilibrium of the 
division of powers between the shareholders and the board of directors.”83  This 
could result in shareholders assuming indirect control over management, 
reducing the need for board monitoring.84  
B.  TOWARD ALGO-BOARDS? 
An even bolder prediction is that machines will replace human-populated 
boards. There are two components to this view: first, board functions are 
becoming more challenging for humans;85 and, second, CorpTech solutions will 
be able to perform board functions better than humans.  
With firms depending more and more on technology, and in an 
environment increasingly characterized by uncertainty and constant 
disequilibrium,86 humans may become less fit to serve as board members than 
machines.87  Humans may also be less willing to do so: in a fully IT-dominated 
environment they will be increasingly incapable of reviewing and overseeing 
self-learning algorithms and yet, as board members, their reputation will be on 
the line if such algorithms prove to be deficient.  
CorpTech could step in and replace human directors as corporate monitors. 
Assaf Hamdani et al. suggest that “AI algorithms may become better on average 
at making governance decisions than individuals due to their superior ability to 
process information, freedom from biases, and lack of side interests.”88 If one 
role is left to the monitoring board, it is in the choice of algorithms.89 Liberated 
 
 81. Id. at 23; Geis, supra note 13, at 267–69, 272–73 (arguing that DLT can enhance voting turnout and 
reduce the costs of shareholder activism). 
 82. Lafarre & Van der Elst, supra note 15, at 25. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Bankewitz et al., supra note 19, at 63. 
 85. See, e.g., id. at 65. 
 86. See, e.g., Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Technology and Corporate Governance: Blockchain, 
Crypto, and Artificial Intelligence, 48 TEX. J. BUS. L. 1, 2 (2019) (predicting that firms face new “conditions of 
radical cognitive and normative uncertainty”).  
 87. See id. at 8–10 (speculating about AI replacing board functions); see also Florian Möslein, Robots in 
the Boardroom: Artificial Intelligence and Corporate Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 649, 649–50 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) (predicting use of AI in 
the boardroom). 
 88. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 229. 
 89. Id. at 230. 
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from their monitoring tasks, boards could focus on  strategic advice instead.90 
Board composition would change accordingly: more business and fewer 
accounting and monitoring experts would be needed.91 
But a more radical prediction is that boards will not necessarily continue 
to exist as we know them, namely as a group of humans. In this view, boards’ 
functions, or board seats, may rather be taken over by algorithms. While 
qualifying VITAL,92 its Finnish peer Alicia T,93 and AI algorithms generally as 
board members may be nothing more than a publicity stunt, the discussions on 
whether legal personality (so-called e-personhood) should be assigned to 
algorithms94 and whether algorithms should be allowed to sit on boards95 signal 
CorpTech’s intrusion into the core of corporate governance. 
III.  THE DEMISE OF THE BOARD AS A TECH NIRVANA FALLACY 
Can board functions be automated to the point of making corporate boards 
superfluous, as the tech proponents envisage?96  
We argue in this Part that the tech proponents’ prediction is unpersuasive: 
it reflects an excessively optimistic view about the present (and predictable) 
capabilities of the salient technological developments, while disregarding the 
impact on CorpTech of human input persistence.   
We develop our tech nirvana fallacy critique in three steps. First, we briefly 
describe what boards do and why they do it (Part III.A). We then take on the 
prediction that machines will make the monitoring board redundant (Part III.B), 
before challenging the claim that technology will enable shareholders to oversee 
managers directly and make mediating boards obsolete (Part III.C). We conclude 
that, although CorpTech will improve boards’ performance, their present core 
functions will remain unchanged. 
A.  BOARDS’ CORE FUNCTIONS 
Before discussing why the tech proponents’ view suffers from a tech 
nirvana fallacy, let us first briefly review why we have boards and what they do. 
Although most readers will be familiar with these concepts, a brief account of 
boards’ core functions will set the stage for the following analysis of why 
technology in the foreseeable future will not displace boards.  
 
 90. Id.; see also Mark Fenwick, Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The End of ‘Corporate’ 
Governance: Hello ‘Platform’ Governance, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 171, 191–97 (2019). 
 91. Hamdani et al., supra note 33, at 230. 
 92. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
 93. Alicia T is the nickname of an AI executive of Finnish software company Tieto. Antony Peyton, Alicia 
Key to Tieto’s AI Leadership Team, FINTECH FUTURES (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.fintechfutures.com/ 
2016/10/alicia-key-to-tietos-ai-leadership-team/. 
 94. See European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to the Commission 
on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA(2017)0051, at 3 (2017) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0051_EN.pdf. But see Gramitto Ricci, supra note 
20, at 889–91 (arguing against e-personhood). 
 95. See Gramitto Ricci, supra note 20, at 899–901. 
 96. See discussion supra Part II.B.  
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The Delaware General Corporation Law, as the most important state 
legislation on corporate law, states that the “business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.”97 In practice, boards do not manage corporations, but rather steer 
them by monitoring the top management in an effort to reduce agency costs.98 
Boards also engage as mediators in order to reduce conflicts with and among 
shareholders and stakeholders.99 
1.  The Monitoring Board 
Collective action problems among dispersed shareholders, coupled with 
their limited access to information,100 leave room for managerial opportunism.101 
In particular, shareholders have traditionally been unable to act upon negative 
signals about managerial performance other than by voting with their feet.102  
A well-functioning board of directors can reduce agency costs;103 an 
independent board may do better than shareholders at monitoring managers on 
their behalf. Directors can combine the signals of inferior performance coming 
from stock prices with their access to inside information in order to gain a better 
sense of whether negative relative stock performance is due to incompetence, 
bad luck, or neither.104 They may well come to the conclusion that managers are 
simply ahead of their times, that is, busy implementing an idiosyncratic vision 
 
 97. DEL. COD. ANN. tit. 8., § 141(a) (2020). 
 98. EISENBERG, supra note 63, at 164–65 (stating that directors’ task is to hold executives accountable for 
adequate results under monitoring model); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 80 (3d ed. 2015) 
(“Among [the various board’s functions] . . . the board’s monitoring role reigns supreme.”). 
 99. Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards of Directors, 22 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 10–14 (1996) [hereinafter Dallas, The Relational Board] (stating that, in addition to monitoring, the board 
assumes a relational role with the external environment including information access and exchange, support of 
corporate business and ensuring legitimacy and status in the eyes of shareholders and stakeholders); see also 
Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board 
Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 101 (1997) [hereinafter Dallas, Proposals for Reform] (outlining 
the relational role of boards). 
 100. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 95 (1986) (detailing the effects of rational apathy on 
shareholder voting); see also Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy”, 2 ACCT., ECON. & L., 
no. 2, 2012, at 1, 7 (2012) (“[S]hareholders’ own rational apathy raises an often-insurmountable obstacle to 
collective action.”). 
 101. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47–49 (1985) (stating 
that opportunism involves self-interested behavior with elements of ploy, deception, misrepresentation or bad 
faith, resulting in management’s appropriation of assets or shirking).  
 102. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder 
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453–57 (1991). 
 103. In addition to boards, other mechanisms that reduce agency conflicts include reputational incentives, 
the market for managerial services, the takeover market, and compensation schemes. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, 
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 831 (1992) 
(providing a list of non-legal constraints on managerial behavior).  
 104. See Gordon, supra note 64, at 1563 (detailing the shift towards “informative[] stock market prices” and 
the evaluation of management’s decisions with stock market signals); see also Enrichetta Ravina & Paola 
Sapienza, What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962, 974, 
1000–01 (2009) (finding that independent directors earn positive and substantial abnormal returns when trading 
in their company shares, which is of course an indication of superior information compared to the market as a 
whole). 
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that the market is yet unable to comprehend and/or price correctly.105 Directors 
also have the incentives to take the necessary steps, because not only are their 
reputations on the line if they remain passive,106 but they are also increasingly 
compensated with stock options that are of no value unless the company’s stock 
performance is positive.107  
Directors are therefore in the position of fruitfully engaging with managers 
if their company is underperforming and determining whether the CEO should 
stay or go. But, of course, monitoring goes way beyond that; in particular, it 
includes three additional tasks.  
First, oversight of management implies some degree of involvement in 
strategy setting:108 a board formally approves a company’s strategies, but it does 
so based on top managers’ proposals and the information set made available to 
it by the latter.109 Given the information disadvantage of (outside) board 
members,110 they are unlikely to be in a position to really define a company’s 
strategy. That is why a board’s approval of strategies is better understood as part 
of its monitoring function: a board reviews the top managers’ definition and 
implementation of the company’s strategy more as a “sounding board” than as a 
(real) decision-maker.111  
In addition, a board’s monitoring function, usually via one or more of its 
committees, focuses on the corporation’s governance, risk management, and 
compliance (hereinafter, “GRC”) systems.112 The board’s oversight on GRC 
systems aims to ensure: first, that the level and characteristics of the risks 
undertaken by the company are consistent with its risk profile (as resulting also 
from its strategies); second, that the risk of infidelity on the part of managers 
and employees is kept low; and, third, that violations of the law are reasonably 
prevented. 
Finally, boards deal with inherent, as well as occasional, conflicts of 
interest between top managers and the corporation, to ensure the corporation’s 
interest prevails, in particular with regard to executive compensation and self-
dealing.113 
 
 105. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 
567 (2016). 
 106. John Armour, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance 
Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 49, 62 (3d ed. 2017) (describing independent directors as “motivated principally 
by ethical and reputational concerns”). 
 107. See, e.g., David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 
59 J. FIN. 2281, 2286–88 (2004). 
 108. See, e.g., Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 218 (2007). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 73, 
543 (2014). 
 113. MACEY, supra note 57, at 51–54, 59–60. 
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2.  The Mediating Board 
In the last few decades, with the reconcentration of ownership in the hands 
of institutional investors114 and the rise of giant asset management companies,115 
boards’ tasks have partly changed. Today, it is the norm for institutional 
shareholders to engage in a dialogue with both company officers and 
independent directors.116 Whether boards should engage in such a relational role 
has been the subject of discussion among U.S. corporate law scholars,117 but 
corporate practice has bypassed the theoretical dispute.  
In recent years, institutional investors have pushed hard to establish two-
way communication between (non-executive) directors and themselves,118 
thereby breaking management’s previously held monopoly in dealing with 
shareholders. As a matter of fact, the continuous dialogue between a company 
and its shareholders is increasingly carried out by boards,119 turning mediation 
into a second core function of boards. 
B.  AUTOMATION OF MONITORING AS THE SOLUTION? 
We argue in this Subpart that, were CorpTech to replace human-populated 
boards, decisions would not be better than they are today from the shareholders’ 
perspective. The contrary assertion rests, on the one hand, on an overly 
optimistic assessment of what technology can do, and, on the other, on an overly 
simplistic view of a board’s current functions. We predict a more limited role 
 
 114. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. 
ECON. PERSPS. 89, 91–93 (2017). 
 115. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 2, 8 (Harv. L. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018) (predicting that control of most public companies will soon be 
concentrated in the hands of a very small number of people, that is, those at the top of large management 
companies). 
 116. See Giovanni Strampelli, Knocking at the Boardroom Door: A Transatlantic Overview of Director-
Institutional Investor Engagement in Law and Practice, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 187, 199 (2018).  
 117. Compare John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are 
U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 840–46 (1999) (detailing cases when the mediating models fails), 
and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 547, 559–60 (2003) (arguing that the mediating model has a small domain), with Dallas, The Relational 
Board, supra note 99, at 3 (arguing that the board is the right organ to mediate among shareholders and 
management and holding that relationship management is part of the board’s fiduciary duties), and John H. 
Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative 
for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (1994) (same). See also Blair & Stout, supra note 66, at 288 
(arguing that corporate law supports the board’s mediating role); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director 
Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 423–38 (2001) (same).  
 118. See Strampelli, supra note 116, at 199 (reporting that U.S. corporations increasingly involve boards, in 
addition to management, in the dialogue with their shareholders).  
 119. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2014) (arguing that shareholder relationship management is an important 
board task); see also Strampelli, supra note 116, at 197–200 (reporting that boards, in addition to management, 
engage in dialogue with shareholders); MCKINSEY & CO., THE BOARD PERSPECTIVE: A COLLECTION OF 
MCKINSEY INSIGHTS FOCUSING ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 49 (2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/ 
McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Leadership/The%20board%20perspective/Issue%20Number%202/2018_Boar
d%20Perspective_Number_2.pdf (stating in Exhibit 5 that in 2017 boards spent 9% of their meeting time on 
shareholder and stakeholder management, up from 0% in 2013). 
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for CorpTech in the boardroom: similar to how, up until today, operational, 
financial, legal, accounting, or risk experts advise boards, which then come to 
their own conclusions based on those experts’ input, CorpTech can and will 
inform board members about options and opportunities without replacing them.  
We first discuss the tech-based arguments against the demise of the 
monitoring board (Part III.B.1) and then turn to the inherent traits of corporate 
governance that justify the prediction of monitoring as a persistent function of 
corporate boards (Part III.B.2). 
1.  IT Limitations 
Technology may help address humans’ cognitive biases and improve the 
quality of their decisions.120 But technology’s own limits make the proposed 
scenario of machines replacing boards unrealistic. These limits121 are outlined 
in this Subpart. In their presence, CorpTech will augment boards’ effectiveness 
but will not replace them.  
a.  Data Dependency 
Predictions identify patterns in past data and offer them as projections 
about future events, basically assuming that history will repeat itself one way or 
another.122 Hence, an algorithm is only as good as the data it works with. Where 
data of the past reflects biases, so too will the machine results:123 the data could 
reflect the biases of prior decision-makers124 or biases that persist in society at 
large.125 Developers tend to be unaware of either any particular deficiencies in 
the data set or the ensuing discrimination.126 As a study on Facebook’s self-
pricing algorithm for educational advertisements has shown, an algorithm 
designed to be gender-neutral still steered advertising for science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics courses to more men than women because the 
algorithm priced advertisement to women higher than advertisement to men; as 
 
 120. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 SOC. RSCH. 499 passim (2019) (arguing 
that algorithms can be designed to be unbiased and perform certain tasks better than biased humans). But see 
Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2251 (2019) (“It is possible to replace one form of 
disparity with another, but impossible to eliminate it altogether.”). 
 121. We do not discuss, though, two obvious IT issues: deficient coding as a result of human inaccuracy 
and exposure to cyber risks. While troublesome, they are not relevant for our purposes as they appear not to have 
any specific implication in regards to CorpTech. 
 122. Mayson, supra note 120, at 2251.  
 123. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 673–74; see also Mayson, supra note 120, at 2251–52.  
 124. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 673–74; see also Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz & Kate 
Crawford, Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing 
Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 192, 204–17 (2019) (detailing examples of manipulated data in the 
criminal justice system, reflecting racial bias). 
 125. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 5, at 671 (“[D]ata mining can discover surprisingly useful regularities 
that are really just preexisting patterns of exclusion and inequality.”). 
 126. Conscious choices may, however, be the result of conflicts of interests (see infra Part III.B.2.b). And 
lack of awareness does not exclude racially or gender biased, or otherwise illegal, practices. See Richardson et 
al., supra note 124, at 193–97 (detailing examples of such practices in the context of predictive policing). 
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a consequence, for a given budget more men than women were exposed to the 
advertisement.127  
Furthermore, AI’s predictive capabilities depend on the training data.128   
The “learning” of a self-learning machine refers to identifying patterns in 
existing data sets where instances of, say, securities fraud are labeled as such.129  
The machine then looks for patterns among the labeled cases without using 
explicit instructions.130 That subset of recurring characteristics can then be used 
for any other dataset.131 Where the subset characteristics are found to be present, 
the machine will assume that securities fraud is also present. What the machine 
“learns” depends on the examples it has been exposed to, as well as on the 
quality of the labeling.132 The closer the training data to the real-world 
application, the better the predictive ability of the AI.133 For instance, a data set 
taken from Enron Corporation has often been used to train many AI-enhanced 
compliance tools.134 As we know today, Enron’s internal communication 
methods and (bad) governance were in many respects outliers, even relative to 
the less governance-aware corporate world of Enron’s times.135 AI trained with 
outlandish, outdated, and incomplete data from Enron will lack predictive 
accuracy for most firms.136  
Firms may seek to enhance predictive accuracy by training the AI with data 
generated inside their own organization.137 In this case, data availability may 
emerge as an issue. Even where firms have the right to use or transfer data,138 
small- and medium-sized firms are likely to lack data pools of sufficient size to 
train the technology.139 Large firms that collect sufficient data, however, may 
 
 127. Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical Study of Apparent Gender-
Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads, 65 MGMT. SCI. 2966, 2966–68, 2977–78 (2019) 
(analyzing an advertisement algorithm intended to be gender-neutral in its delivery and concluding that any 
algorithm that simply optimizes cost-effectiveness in ad delivery will deliver ads in an apparently discriminatory 
way). 
 128. See RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 48, at 701–02.  
 129. See generally id. at 693–95 (discussing various types of learning algorithms that use input-output pairs).  
 130. Id. at 694–95, 698.  
 131. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 95. 
 132. Id.; RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 48, at 701–02.  
 133. See id. at 706–08 (describing preconditions of learning from examples). 
 134. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 97 (stating that machine learning developers use coaching 
data from widely available data sets, such as the Enron email data set that was originally put online by the U.S. 
Federal Energy Regulation Commission). The data set contains data from about 150 users, mostly senior 
management of Enron, with a total of about half a million messages. William W. Cohen, Enron Email Dataset, 
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~./enron/ (May 8, 2015).  
 135. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 23, at 270–71, 282–82; CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW 
AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AROUND THE WORLD 47–67 (2008) (discussing the Enron scandal).  
 136. The e-mails’ text had been redacted in response to privacy concerns and attachments to messages had 
been deleted to reduce data size. Cohen, supra note 134. 
 137. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 97–98.  
 138. The data pool available for Corptech training may be limited by legal barriers, including data 
protection, intellectual property laws, and confidentiality agreements signed with customers and business 
partners. See id. at 100. 
 139. Id. at 98.  
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hesitate to share firm-specific data with external developers. These data may be 
too valuable to share in an environment where “data is the new oil,”140 as they, 
or the training results thereof, can be, respectively, copied and (once 
incorporated into services) sold to competitors. Worse still, external developers 
may become competitors themselves after assembling a large enough data 
pool.141  
Finally, finding some regularities in past data (however recent and “big”) 
is more useful in some areas, such as medical diagnoses and image recognition, 
than in others, such as social dynamics. Human behavior is less predictable, as 
markets and people’s preferences evolve. Because humans adapt to changes, 
responses to a given context that were observed regularly in the past will not 
necessarily be good predictors of the future.  To generalize, correlations between 
complex, dynamic human phenomena that interact with other organizations and 
an indefinite number of individuals (stakeholders, consumers, etc.), are poor 
predictors of future outcomes. 
The data dependency problems highlighted so far reflect the current state 
of the relevant technologies. These problems may well be overcome at some 
point in the future. For instance, an application for bias analysis may recognize 
and remedy the impact of biased data,142 and the publicly available data pools 
can become large enough to allow for accurate training. Even then, however, the 
core issue with data dependency, namely, its backward orientation, will remain 
unresolved: in real life, it is normally the case that the right answers to the 
questions defining the success or failure of a firm, such as whether to enter a 
new market or to leave the CEO in place, to assume growth or a shrinking global 
demand mid- to long-term, cannot be found in past data. AI-based predictions 
can effectively support those decisions, but in the end something very human is 
required: judgment.143 
 
 140. The origin of this sentence is uncertain. One of the earliest sources to use it dates back to 2006. Michael 
Palmer, Data Is the New Oil, ANA MARKETING MAESTROS (Nov. 3, 2006, 5:43 AM), http://ana.blogs.com/ 
maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html.  
 141. Cf. Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner & Janos N. Barberis, From FinTech to 
TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 393, 399–415 (2018)  
(analyzing the entrance of big data firms like Alibaba, Amazon, Apple, Baidou and Google into the financial 
services sector). 
 142. See Rumman Chowdhury & Narendra Mulani, Auditing Algorithms for Bias, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/auditing-algorithms-for-bias (presenting a tool developed by Accenture and 
the Alan Turing Institute that measures the discriminatory impact of big data applications and corrects for 
predictive parity to achieve equal opportunity). 
 143. See Surden, supra note 6, at 97–98 (arguing that AI approximates intelligence by detecting proxies, 
patterns, or heuristics and emphasizing that many complicated problems “may not be amenable to such a 
heuristic-based technique”); Mohammad Hossein Jarrahi, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work: 
Human-AI Symbiosis in Organizational Decision Making, 61 BUS. HORIZONS 577, 580 (2018) (“Unlike board 
games, in which the probability of the next action can be calculated, real-world decision making is messy and 
reliance on probabilistic, analytical thinking tends to be insufficient.”). 
78 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:55 
b.  Conflicts with Human Ethics 
Morally wrong determinations can seriously harm a firm’s reputation and 
its share price.144 Were CorpTech to make such decisions, the risk of unethical 
determinations revealing themselves to be spectacular mistakes would 
skyrocket. That is because training machines in ethical matters is an impossible 
challenge, as “[ethical] norms are fuzzy.”145 Humans themselves often cannot 
tell what prompts their value judgments. Even in a CorpTech world, then, 
aligning corporate behavior with mainstream ethics requires human involvement 
(and human-populated board oversight).  
c.  Inferior Handling of Incomplete Law 
Where an incident (a violation of the law or an employee’s wrongdoing) is 
reported, the corporate response will depend on a unique combination of factors. 
In fact, most GRC issues imply discretion, even for cases that are very similar 
to past ones. Hence, a pre-determined 1/0, yes/no algorithm will be unable to 
reach good decisions on how to react.146 This is the inevitable implication of the 
incompleteness that characterizes the legal environment, where not only are 
contracts incomplete, but so too is the law itself:147 neither contracts nor the law 
can provide for clear-cut rules for every situation. Drafting exhaustive contracts 
and laws would be incredibly expensive and, in fact, outright impossible, and so 
too would the creation of a CorpTech solution attempting to do just that.148 
Governance arrangements themselves are incomplete on purpose,149 and hence 
unfit for strict tech-based execution.  
 
 144. For instance, its relationship with Definers Public Affairs, a Washington-based opposition research 
firm cost Facebook nine percent of its share price on a single day, or $36 billion, which at the time was slightly 
less than the total value of the carmaker Ford. Salvador Rodriguez, Here Are the Scandals and Other Incidents 
That Have Sent Facebook’s Share Price Tanking in 2018, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/20/ 
facebooks-scandals-in-2018-effect-on-stock.html (Nov. 20, 2018, 10:22 PM). 
 145. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996). 
 146. 1/0 is the paradigm of Boolean logic. But human judgment follows neither Boolean logic nor any other 
conventional mathematical discipline. This is also true when you soften the 0/1 paradigm using probability 
theory or fuzzy logic (since fuzzy logic can operate with all infinite values within the interval <0, 1>). See, e.g., 
Václav Bezděk, Using Fuzzy Logic in Business, 124 PROCEDIA—SOC. & BEHAV. SCIS. 371, 372–79 (2014). 
Whether an observer holds an incident to be probable (from her subjective point of view) or she puts an incident 
into the “more negative rather than positive” box (using fuzzy logic, which requires preferences in a given order), 
the analysis applying an ad hoc mix of factors results in the qualification of conduct as likely (probability) or 
“more harmful than helpful” (fuzzy logic). If the factors that justify 0 or 1, a given probability assessment, or 
the preferences for fuzzy qualification are impossible to discern ex ante, they cannot be put into code. See id.  
 147. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127–28 (2d ed. 1994) and, more recently, Katharina Pistor 
& Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 931, 938–44 (2003). With specific reference 
to compliance issues, see Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 
TEMP. L. REV. 727, 734 (2018) (“[C]omplication arises from the subjective nature of law and legal risk. Law is 
often full of ambiguity, even when factual questions are posed clearly.”). See also Joshua P. Davis, Artificial 
Wisdom? A Potential Limit on AI in Law (and Elsewhere), 72 OKLA. L. REV. 51, 61–65 (2019) (arguing that AI 
is incapable of mimicking value-based decisions since it misses the first-person perspective).  
 148. See Aghion et al., supra note 61, at 41–42 (arguing that AI technologies will not overcome contractual 
incompleteness). 
 149. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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Even where a board finds that management is responsible for a GRC 
failure, a formal sanction might not always be warranted: handling GRC 
situations will often involve an aspect of judgment and/or adjudication under 
conditions of significant uncertainty regarding the response of the sanctioned 
person(s) and that of stakeholders (including employees, the public and others). 
That requires the discretionary, creative, and non-rule based decision-making 
that is, at least for the predictable future, part of the human skillset that machines 
are unable to replicate.150 In an environment that is otherwise under the 
increasing influence of technology, the board brings in the unpredictable yet 
indispensable human factor.151  
 2.  Governance’s Inherent Traits 
a.  The Incomplete Corporate Contract 
A corporation is often described as a nexus of contracts, that is, a bundle 
of formal and informal relationships among the various stakeholders.152 These 
contracts are incomplete, and intentionally so, since writing a multiplicity of 
complete contracts between a firm’s stakeholders would be either excessively 
costly or unduly constraining.153 For these reasons, governance arrangements 
are incomplete on purpose and, hence, unfit for strict tech-based execution. It is 
a board’s task to continue writing chapters of the corporate contract where 
necessary. Corporate governance provides the tools to deal with such 
incompleteness: as circumstances change and new information becomes 
available, management, boards, and shareholders react by making decisions, 
each in their own sphere, that allow for adaptation and optimization to a degree 
that ex ante planning could not match.154  
CorpTech will not eradicate contractual incompleteness, whether by 
superior ex ante planning or by better-than-human ex post decisions. Such 
eradication would require not only access to, and correct processing of, all 
existing data in the world (something that CorpTech may well provide for in the 
 
 150. See Dylan Hadfield-Menell & Gillian K. Hadfield, Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment, in 
AAAI/ACM CONFERENCE ON AI, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 417, 419–20 (2019) (arguing that coders are yet 
incapable of replicating norms and standards that grant discretion to their addressees). 
 151. This is not to deny that humans, and human-populated boards, make mistakes too. See infra notes 156–
160.  
 152. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1426 (1989). 
 153. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
91–93 (1991). This point is acknowledged in the literature on new technologies. See Sklaroff, supra note 8, at 
263 (arguing that human-based contracting is flexible due to inherent incompleteness, while machine-based 
contracting creates new inefficiencies from automation, decentralization, and anonymity); Adam J. Kolber, Not-
So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 198, 220 (2018) (arguing 
that the code does not reflect the entirety of the parties’ agreement); Hadfield-Menell & Hadfield, supra note 
150, at 421–22 (emphasizing “parallels between the challenge of incomplete contracting in the human principal-
agent setting and the challenge of misspecification in robot reward functions”).  
 154. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 152, at 1437–39 (arguing that the contract adopted as optimal 
ex ante may not be optimal ex post, for instance due to changing circumstances such as a takeover bid). 
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future), but also the ability to predict all future developments. In a non-
deterministic world like the one that humans inhabit, and where humans still 
make meaningful decisions, machines are highly unlikely to become powerful 
enough to do that. Any set of codes predicting future events would require a 
significant level of speculation and thus would be certain to be flawed (despite 
its prohibitive cost). 
To be sure, the benchmark of technology, and AI in particular, is not 
perfection but human parity.155 Any CorpTech solution completing contracts ex 
post better than human boards would justify algorithmic boards. And it is easy 
to acknowledge that human boards are themselves far from perfect in making 
the decisions executing the incomplete corporate contract. Arguably, they are 
also limited in their ability to learn, as recurring governance scandals 
demonstrate. Still, one thing human boards are better at than CorpTech, and can 
be predicted to be for a long time, are complex interactions with humans.156 Take 
the example of the Wells Fargo scandal.157 The bank was forced to switch to 
political mode and face, among other things, multiple U.S. House and Senate 
Committee hearings158 in order to minimize the reputational fallout.159 Such a 
mode includes intense lobbying action, public relations efforts, and generally 
presenting in a positive light a firm’s corporate culture, values, and ethics. Soft 
skills and fuzzy matters such as these are unsuitable for automation:160 any 
sufficiently intricate, politically charged matter requires humans to interact with 
humans.  
b.  Conflicts of Interest 
An algorithm is not an “impartial” tool: it assists its creators in settling 
affairs within a community according to its creators’ preferences.161 So long as 
algorithms are written by humans and, even more importantly, sold to humans, 
claims that algorithms can be non-conflicted or neutral are ill-founded: 
CorpTech solutions are bound to reflect the interests and views of those 
ultimately in control of the code design and/or selection process. If, as has 
hitherto been the case across corporations, management wields influence over 
 
 155. See RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 48, at 2–3. 
 156. Simple communication between machines and humans does take place regularly and frequently.  
 157. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., Holding Megabanks Accountable: An Examination of Wells Fargo’s Pattern of Consumer 
Abuses: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Timothy J. Sloan, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Wells Fargo). 
 159. For an account of how Wells Fargo managed the scandal fallout, see Hilary Fussell Sisco, Financial 
Crisis Management and Wells Fargo: Reputation or Profit?, in THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL 
COMMUNICATION AND INVESTOR RELATIONS 319, 319 (Alexander V. Laskin ed., 2018). 
 160. See Hadfield-Menell & Hadfield, supra note 150, at 421 (acknowledging that “alignment of artificially 
intelligent agents with human goals and values is a fundamental challenge in AI research”). 
 161. See LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY 21–22 (1986).  
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the CorpTech system as a component of its IT system,162 then CorpTech 
solutions will reflect management’s interests and views. If management’s 
incentives are not perfectly aligned to those of their principals, then boards’ (and 
shareholders’) trust in the relevant CorpTech will be misplaced.163  
The coders (perhaps with the help of their marketing departments if they 
are independent suppliers) will understand which functions, within corporations, 
are in charge of selecting them as code suppliers and directing their work. They 
will naturally make product choices that fit such buyers’ interests. If decisions 
on Corptech products are under managers’ control, then the CorpTech will 
further management’s interests. 
To illustrate this general point about conflicted coding, take the issue of 
managerial compensation. It has been debated whether this is an area where 
abuse and suboptimal bad practices are ripe, be it because CEO compensation 
packages are excessive or because prevailing compensation practices generate 
skewed incentives for managers.164 Contrary to the tech proponents’ view,165 
unless the analogic mechanics of executive compensation setting are fixed (so 
long as they need fixing),166 digital solutions will be no better than analogue 
ones. In fact, if the current system relying on compensation consultants selected 
by independent board committees and assisting the latter in their determinations 
is flawed, then there is little reason to believe that an algorithm will improve 
upon current practices: it will instead reflect any flaws arising from them. What 
it can achieve is the devising of the perfect compensation package that the 
existing compensation practices allow for: this is a different kind of perfect—
perfect not in the sense of being optimal for shareholders, but in the sense of 
 
 162. Chief Information (or Technology) Officers usually report to the CEO or the CFO. See, e.g., 
ALEXANDER HÜTTER & RENÉ RIEDL, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER ROLE EFFECTIVENESS: LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 12 (2017). 
 163. In other words, the governance risk of CorpTech stems not only from “bad coding” in a technical sense, 
but also from the fact that code developed under management influence is bound to be skewed towards 
management’s interests. John Armour, Luca Enriques, Ariel Ezrachi & John Vella, Putting Technology to Good 
Use for Society: The Role of Corporate, Competition and Tax Law, 6 J. BRIT. ACAD. 285, 298 (2018) (“[T]he 
incentives of the persons designing a firm’s internal performance monitoring systems are likely to become even 
more significant.”). 
 164. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 passim (2002) (arguing that 
structural flaws in corporate governance have enabled managers to influence their own pay and extract rents to 
the detriment of shareholders), with Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power 
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 passim (2002) (criticizing Bebchuk, Fried, 
and Walker’s theses), and Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPS. 5, 8–14 
(2008) (criticizing the view that U.S. CEOs are overpaid and not paid for performance). 
 165. As we have seen, some have suggested that AI and Big Data may allow a company to consider all 
relevant information and possibly learn from other companies’ best practices to devise the optimal compensation 
package, while smart contracts could make the compensation arrangement harder to alter in opportunistic ways 
further down the road. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 166. The jury, of course, is still out on whether executive compensation is more a solution to, or a 
manifestation of, managerial agency problems. For a recent discussion of the various facets of the problem, see, 
for example, Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive Remuneration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 334 passim (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). 
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perfectly processing all information in the way that best caters to the interests of 
those who control the process. 
c.  Information Flows 
The biggest hindrance to a more balanced distribution of power between 
management, boards, and shareholders in publicly held corporations is 
management’s exclusive access to the inner workings of the corporate business 
and its ensuing filtering role regarding the information set that is needed to 
monitor its performance.167 Can IT solutions overcome such a hitherto inevitable 
corporate governance trait? So long as management retains control of the coding, 
data sources, and algorithms used for reporting to a board,168 the answer is no.  
Take again here the example of executive compensation. Optimal 
compensation packages are firm- and employee-specific.169 Coding optimal 
compensation models requires in-depth, firm-specific, forward-looking 
information usually monopolized by management. If management is involved, 
it can be expected to use its superior knowledge to make sure that the code 
reflects its interests. 
When an AI CorpTech product processes data, understanding the extent to 
which management manipulates a board by providing more or less data than 
necessary and whether the algorithm presents them in an unbiased way is 
increasingly difficult. The risk of algo-supported board members becoming 
executives’ puppets without the slightest suspicion of being manipulated may be 
even higher than for analogue boards. In fact, well-functioning analogue boards 
are trained to second-guess the completeness and reliability of the supporting 
information selected by the CEO. They may rely on their experience and on their 
instincts. In an algorithmic world, these instincts may prove less useful and it 
may be harder to question the completeness and reliability of information that a 
supposedly objective machine, rather than a self-interested human, has selected 
and processed. 
C.  THE BOARD DISINTERMEDIATION HYPOTHESIS 
Involvement in shareholder dialogue grants independent directors an 
important mediating role between shareholders and the company’s management. 
The mediating role is premised on shareholder identification and shareholder 
intelligence: companies have to get to know their shareholders (something that 
CorpTech will facilitate).170 In addition, if companies are to secure shareholder 
 
 167. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 63, at 144 (“[T]he amount, quality, and structure of the information 
that reaches the board is almost wholly within the control of the corporation’s executives.”); see also Bengt 
Holmlström, Pay without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment, 30 J. CORP. L. 703, 
711 (2005) (highlighting how boards need to have the CEO’s trust for the latter to be willing to share essential 
information about the company with the former). 
 168. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 169. See, e.g., David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal 
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 609, 621–23 (2011).  
 170. See supra Part I.A.2 for examples of DLT-based CorpTech solutions. 
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backing, they also have to know their individual shareholders’ preferences. 
Shareholder dialogue, finally, is more than simple information transmission 
(something at which CorpTech is particularly good): it can include the difficult 
task of persuading shareholders that something (seemingly) at odds with their 
preferences should nevertheless be given support. In practice, this often involves 
various rounds of negotiations and requires—as we argue in this Subpart—a 
significant degree of human judgment.  
Tech proponents argue that CorpTech will change the (relatively new) 
mediating role of a board in two ways. First, it may enable shareholders to 
monitor management themselves, making the board’s monitoring on their behalf 
obsolete. In a CorpTech-dominated environment where the costs of shareholder 
engagement, and voting in particular, are greatly reduced, direct shareholder-to-
management relations may substitute for the present board-centered governance 
framework.171 Second, CorpTech could make the mediating functions of non-
executive members similarly passé, as the new information tools may allow 
shareholders to directly engage with management just as effectively.   
In this Subpart, we show that this board disintermediation hypothesis is 
flawed: again, it disregards inherent governance features, which technology 
cannot cure, and IT limitations.  
1.   Governance’s Inherent Features 
The board disintermediation hypothesis rests on two assumptions: first, 
that CorpTech allows for real-time accounting and “full transparency;” and, 
second, that CorpTech further reduces the cost of processing available 
information and deciding how to vote. The combination of the two should enable 
shareholders to do the monitoring board’s job themselves. We do not question 
the technical possibility of processing and analyzing a virtually unlimited 
volume of information. And, incidentally, we leave apart the fact that DLTs 
reduce the risk of data manipulation but, of course, do not ensure that data stored 
via DLTs is correct.172 We argue instead that the full transparency hypothesis is 
unrealistic and that, even if it was realistic, shareholder monitoring would still 
be patchy at best. We finally contend that shareholder dialogue exclusively 
involving executives, rather than directors, would lead to inferior outcomes. 
a.  Information Asymmetries to Persist 
Corporations are engines of innovation. Shareholders delegate the power 
to conduct a company’s business to a management team which has full control 
over the company’s operations and resources under the board’s oversight.  
Delegation is also needed to preserve confidentiality of a company’s plans and 
strategies, which in turn is necessary for it to make profits. This is a simple fact 
 
 171. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 172. See, e.g., Zetzsche et al., supra note 7, at 1374. 
84 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:55 
that is ignored in the assumption that technology-enabled full transparency can 
be realized.173 
Issuer disclosures, whether mandatory or voluntary, have become more 
frequent and rich,174 and will become even more so in an AI-enhanced 
environment where the use of machines should make information overload less 
of a concern for policymakers.175 Yet, U.S. corporations can be particularly 
reticent when it comes to discussing their plans, strategies, R&D projects, and 
anything that may be of crucial interest to competitors. One example of that is 
Apple’s protracted silence over its Apple Watch sales. While analysts agree that 
such sales figures would be extremely valuable information for investors,176 U.S. 
securities regulation does not require Apple to disclose them and Apple’s 
management has consistently refused to voluntarily provide the market with the 
relevant figures.177  
Not only are corporate disclosures bound to remain patchy, but it is also 
highly unlikely that technology will prevent traders from concealing their trades, 
given the value of secrecy for their success.178 Tech proponents themselves 
acknowledge this and present the scenario of full trading and ownership 
transparency as just one option that may become available on the market for 
individual issuers to choose.179 However, even issuers most worried about 
hostile takeovers and activist campaigns will find an all-transparent trading 
environment unattractive, and prefer tools less harmful to their cost of capital in 
order to insulate themselves from hostile bidders and activists. 
b.  Passive and Closet Index Funds: Collective Action Problems to 
Persist 
Even in a world with lesser (or no) information asymmetry, the board 
disintermediation hypothesis disregards the real problem with informed voting: 
rational reticence. If a passive mutual fund invests in information in order to cast 
the right (shareholder-value maximizing) pivotal vote, it will improve a 
company’s stock performance, which means that free-riding competitors will 
 
 173. See, e.g., Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for Corporate Disclosure, 35 
YALE J. ON REGUL. 383, 391–92 (2018) (highlighting how sharing information about a firm’s successes and 
failures may have a negative impact on its profitability).  
 174. See Gordon, supra note 64, at 1545–61. 
 175. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 passim (2003) (outlining the argument that too much information 
can be counterproductive). 
 176. See, e.g., Don Reisinger, Here’s How Popular Apple Watch Was Last Quarter, FORTUNE (Feb. 8, 2017, 
9:09 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/02/08/apple-watch-2016-sales/ (reporting analysts’ estimate of Apple 
Watch’s sales during the fourth quarter of 2016). 
 177. Id. (“While Apple has said that its smartwatch is popular, the company has never revealed actual sales 
figures. Apple CEO Tim Cook has argued that sharing sales figures could help competitors.”); see also Haeberle 
& Henderson, supra note 173, at 392–94 (using the example of Apple’s iPad sales to illustrate how disclosure 
thereof would lead to reduced cashflows). 
 178. Note that this argument is independent of technological progress; it will hold true even if data 
processing and storage capacity keep growing exponentially. 
 179. Yermack, supra note 43, at 18. 
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gain more than the passive mutual fund does.180 Unless the costs of getting 
informed and voting become negligible, technology will not alter the incentive 
of passive institutional investors (and closet index funds)181 to remain reticent.  
We expect reticence to be particularly persistent given the increasing market 
share of passively managed mutual funds in the asset management market.182  
Delegating the whole process of deciding how to vote to a machine would 
drive down the (marginal) costs of becoming informed and voting to close to 
zero. An algorithm would gather all available information, evaluate it according 
to a set of criteria based on its own data-crunching algorithms and spit out a 
voting recommendation. That is what, with a human touch, proxy advisors do.183  
It is immediately clear, though, that developing proprietary software for these 
purposes would be too large an investment for an institution that mainly 
competes on management fees. Existing providers of proxy services are thus 
most likely to be the ones that will come up with such a product. Alternatively, 
perhaps asset management service providers, such as BlackRock, could develop 
this product as part of their management and administration analytics tools.184  
BlackRock itself, though, is an unlikely supplier of such a product.  If it were to 
provide the tools for determining other institutions’ voting decisions, existing 
concerns about the disproportionate power of behemoth institutional investors 
and the anticompetitive effects of common ownership would substantially 
increase.185 The prospect of a negative political reaction would likely discourage 
BlackRock (or other large players in the asset management industry) from 
entering into the proxy advice market.  
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that one large investment 
house develops voting decisions algorithms, it is open to question whether an 
algorithm would, on average, do better at issuing voting recommendations than 
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 181. In addition to overtly passive index funds, a number of “closet index funds” exist that are marketed as 
actively managed funds but de facto replicate the composition of entire markets or segments thereof. K.J. Martijn 
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 182. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2019). 
 183. See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age 
of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1398–99 (2014). 
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Aladdin, see Daniel Haberly, Duncan MacDonald-Korth, Michael Urban & Dariusz Wójcik, Asset Management 
as a Digital Platform Industry: A Global Financial Network Perspective, 106 GEOFORUM 167, 172, 176–80 
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Birdthistle, Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Digital Finance Platforms: Toward a New Regulatory 
Paradigm, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2020).  
 185. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268–72 (2016) (outlining 
the antitrust perils of ownership of firms within the same industry by the same large institutions). 
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the staff of Institutional Shareholder Services or Glass Lewis, the two dominant 
proxy advisors today.186  
In turn, if those designing and selling the software are the two proxy 
advisory firms themselves, as can reasonably be predicted, their product may 
avoid some human error. But it is far from clear that the relevant software would 
succeed in overcoming the (apparent) deficiencies of today’s proxy advisory 
services, which many characterize as box-ticking, one-size-fits-all exercises 
mirroring the majority views among institutional investor clients,187 which are 
themselves often laden with conflicts of interests.188 In theory, algorithms may 
be equally good at that, if not better, but it is hard to understand how they could 
do things in a different, more tailored and more granular way without obtaining 
specific input from the institutional investor client using them, which institutions 
other than the world’s largest would find burdensome and hence competitively 
harmful.189  
c.  Active Investing and Shareholder Activism: Less or More? 
Rational reticence is not a problem for institutional investors that are 
overweighted on a given stock, that is, when they “own a greater share of the 
specific company than [they] own of the market generally,”190 as is usually the 
case for (truly) actively managed funds and activist funds.191  
Active traders and activist investors are in fact among the main participants 
in the dialogue between corporate boards and shareholders: active investors may 
respond to unexpected negative information by selling the corporate stock unless 
the company’s ongoing dialogue with them has laid the foundations for good 
relations and trust long before difficulties emerge. Activist investors’ demands, 
in turn, keep boards on their toes, prompting directors to assess the merits of 
such demands, attempt to persuade the activists that their demands are 
unjustified, and/or secure support from other shareholders against the activists. 
Tech proponents predict lower returns for both investor types because of 
the full transparency they envisage, which would reduce the likelihood of 
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November 2020] CORPORATE TECHNOLOGIES 87 
profiting from informational advantages. If both strategies became less 
profitable, fewer investors of this kind would have to be expected. That, in turn, 
should reduce the need for board mediation.192  
For the sake of argument, let us leave aside the fact that the full 
transparency scenario is unrealistic.193 Even in a hypothetical full transparency 
scenario, it would follow from the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox that there would 
be room for active (informed) trading.194 Consider that even in a CorpTech 
world, information gathering and processing requires some investment. If share 
prices perfectly and constantly reflected all available information, those who 
spent resources to obtain information would receive no compensation and hence 
would have no incentive to invest in information gathering and processing to 
begin with. Without active trading, however, prices would no longer reflect all 
available information, which in turn would make it profitable for active traders 
to come back to the market and push prices “back” to the levels justified by the 
available information. 
We can go one step further and argue that it is far from certain that less 
active investing would follow the widespread adoption of CorpTech. We can 
understand active investing as the outcome of an inequation with three values: 
information costs (I), trading costs (T), and returns from trading (R).  If R > I + 
T, active investing will follow. Technology, by making big data analytics tools 
widely available, may indeed reduce profit opportunities from informed trading 
(resulting in a lower R). But at the same time, both information costs (I) and 
trading costs (T) would go down: DLT (as a storage tool) and AI (as an analytical 
tool) will reduce information costs, while one of DLT’s core applications will 
be clearing and settlement, implying lower trading costs. If, due to technology, 
I and T become lower than today, then more informed trading could result, even 
where R is lower than today. All in all, similar to the present world we expect 
an “equilibrium degree of disequilibrium,”195 with a varying degree of active 
trading—at times more, at times less—to continue. 
This insight can be transferred to activist strategies. Activist strategies are 
the outcome of a similar inequation as above: if R > I + T + E, activism will 
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follow.196 Here, R stands for returns from activism while I and T are, again, 
information and trading costs and E stands for engagement costs. If R, thanks to 
technology, were the only variable to fall, then the outcome would be less 
activism. However, DLTs, big data analytics, and AI should reduce I and T.197  
Hence, even a lower R may still generate profits.  
The important point here is that, as long as there is any gain to be made 
from informed trading or activist strategies, with new technologies driving down 
costs we may see more, rather than less, active trading, or activism, respectively.  
If this is the case, technology would make the need for a mediating institution 
like a board of directors even greater than it is today. 
d.  Shareholder Dialogue with Conflicted Managers Less Fruitful 
If dialogue with and among shareholders reverted to being mediated by 
managers, outcomes would be different, and arguably worse: to start with, some 
ideas presented by shareholders would not find fertile ground when presented to 
management. For instance, shareholders asking for the removal of the CEO, 
proposing a control sale, or pressing against a CEO’s pet project that, in their 
view, destroys corporate value, will receive, at best, a lukewarm response when 
they contact the CEO. On the contrary, they might more easily sow the seeds of 
doubt when meeting independent directors. Their mediation, in turn, may reduce 
either the cost of implementing the change or the risk of escalation in case the 
company resists the appeal for change. 
In addition, in the absence of board involvement, information flows among 
shareholders, as currently mediated to some degree by the companies’ boards, 
may become less fluid. If shareholders fear that management is taking advantage 
of the views they share with it, they may be less inclined to air them, preventing 
the company from relaying such views to other shareholders. With less fluid 
communications among shareholders, the risk of polarization of views among 
shareholders would increase and uncompromising and suboptimal positions 
would correspondingly be more likely to prevail.  
2.  IT Limitations  
One could also imagine a world in which algorithms replace boards in their 
mediating functions. For such a scenario to be realistic, it would have to be the 
case that the relevant CorpTech is able to imitate the full variety of human 
behavior, in an effort to accommodate various parties with antagonistic views 
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and to facilitate the emergence of value-creating solutions. That is highly 
unlikely to be the case.198  
Technology experimenting with adjudication functions does exist199 but is 
limited to either non-complex adjudication tasks (including claims collection for 
traffic violations, paying/denying insurance and public benefits) or supervisory 
orders in time-sensitive situations (such as gas leaks, nuclear fall-out, and 
intervention in algo-based trading systems).200 Neither of these settings present 
similarities with the environment where board-style mediation tasks are 
performed.  
To be sure, technology will make progress and will possibly become able 
to manage complex social interactions: Google’s virtual assistant scheduling 
barber appointments is one prototypical example, with many more certain to 
follow.201 In a distant future, technology may entertain “social” interactions with 
humans. Nevertheless, the coding of mediating board functions will be 
particularly challenging: while technology may be particularly good at juggling 
a variety of conflicting interests (for example, in data terms, variables), in 
corporate matters it is rarely certain which constituencies pursue which interests.  
At the beginning of controversial processes, all constituencies demand the 
maximum, use side demands to cloak their true motives, or remain silent, 
according to the circumstances, in an effort to generate strategic advantages in 
negotiations.  
Given AI CorpTech’s dependency on data,202 where there is no (or in our 
case, no reliable) data to process, technology cannot help. Human board 
members spend significant time (through conversations and other forms of 
human interaction) on identifying crucial and less crucial interests, in an effort 
to pinpoint the crunch line for a brokered compromise among antagonistic 
shareholder groups and/or between management and the shareholder base.203  
The challenge lies in the dynamic nature of such interactions. Governance 
mediation takes place within a highly volatile system involving multiple actors, 
diverse interests, and a firm’s very future, which is, of course, uncertain.  In 
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short, this system is a complex one in the scientific meaning, that is, a system 
with “a significant number of interconnected parts that as a whole tend to interact 
in a nonlinear manner.”204 From a technological perspective: “[a]s the dynamics 
of the system being modeled become more volatile, so too do the predictions of 
that system’s behavior.”205 In plain language, AI-driven predictions, in such a 
setting, are random.  
D.  INTERMEDIATE RESULTS: UTOPIA RECONSIDERED  
Based on what we know today about technology and corporate governance, 
the scenario of corporate board obsolescence is unrealistic. As we have shown 
in this Subpart, corporate governance challenges will persist even in a tech-
dominated environment, so long as human beings wield influence over the firm’s 
assets. As ever, corporate governance will ultimately be about who controls 
corporate assets and how much the interests of those in control deviate from 
those of the shareholders. As a corollary, contrary to the tech proponents’ view, 
technological changes are unlikely to trivialize the board’s core monitoring and 
mediating functions.   
Yet, in a CorpTech age, the focal point of corporate governance conflicts 
will indeed change and is arguably changing already:206 one key question is 
becoming who controls the CorpTech within the firm. Decisions such as whether 
the firm develops its own algorithms internally and under which chain of 
command, which algorithms are licensed for which purpose, which data pool is 
analyzed, and so on, now affect the quality of a firm’s governance as never 
before. If management is in control of those decisions, we expect it to choose 
coders and technology designs catering to its own interests, which may not be 
perfectly aligned with the interests of shareholders. On top comes the risk that, 
in the transition to a CorpTech-dominated environment, insufficient 
understanding of the limits of CorpTech and over-confidence in its promise may 
even aggravate agency problems within firms. 
Depending on how CorpTech governance itself is designed, the 
implementation of CorpTech solutions may cut both ways: it can be instrumental 
in either enhancing or reducing agency costs. Correspondingly, CorpTech is 
bound to either reinforce the board’s monitoring role, by improving the factual 
basis for human judgement-based decisions and the detection of compliance 
failures, or weaken it, by feeding directors with management-friendly analytical 
tools. The former will happen if human-populated boards exist that control the 
CorpTech choice and application, while the latter is likely if boards are replaced 
by, or disregard the risks associated with, CorpTech. To conclude, CorpTech by 
itself will not ensure better governance, but requires a governance framework 
ensuring that its benefits come to the fore, while associated risks are under 
control.   
 
 204. Katz, supra note 199, at 959.  
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This conclusion holds with one important caveat: if predictions, as per the 
old saw, are difficult, especially about the future, predictions about technological 
innovation and its impact are even harder to make. At some point in the distant 
future, CorpTech may become so sophisticated as to be able to keep 
management under control better than humans.  If and when that will be the case, 
however, no one can tell today.  
IV.  A GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR THE CORPTECH AGE 
What are the elements of the governance framework that will ensure 
CorpTech’s beneficial impact? In the following Subparts we lay out some 
normative considerations and provide some ideas on how to shape board 
governance in the CorpTech age.  
A.  PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION? 
A focus on CorpTech governance is only justified if market mechanisms 
do not already ensure that CorpTech serves shareholders’ interests. In fact, one 
could counter that the natural solution to the new tech-centered dimension of 
intracorporate conflicts of interest is the market itself, that is, competition among 
suppliers of CorpTech products.207 This Subpart casts doubt on the idea that 
product market competition can be sufficient to let us stop worrying and 
unreservedly embrace CorpTech. 
First of all, there are reasons to be skeptical about the likelihood of the 
market for CorpTech solutions delivering products that are genuinely in line 
with the interests of shareholders. For one, product market competition works 
only where a sufficient number of suppliers of CorpTech systems offer services, 
struggling for clients’ attention through innovation and product differentiation.  
With the sector still being in its infancy, it is pure speculation whether one, a 
handful, or many CorpTech providers will survive in the medium to long term.  
Yet, if past trends are of any guidance, time and again long-term software market 
dynamics yield a small number of dominant IT platforms.208 Given the network 
effects and economies of scale inherent in data-driven applications, which 
increase switching costs and entry barriers,209 a different equilibrium is unlikely 
in the CorpTech market. 
To be sure, even in a market dominated by a few firms, one or more among 
them may start competing by building a pro-shareholder brand. Corporations’ 
 
 207. See Bamberger, supra note 16, at 713 (arguing in favor of diversification of risk management systems 
to counter implicit biases). 
 208. See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010) 
(arguing that information markets tend to turn into monopolies until they are replaced by superior technology). 
See also Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716, 784–86 (2017) (detailing how 
traditional antitrust law interpretation furthers the build-up of monopolies in platform markets); Aghion et al., 
supra note 61, at 32–33 (arguing that data access may act as an entry barrier for creating competing networks, 
hence the incumbent’s platform prevails). 
 209. Khan, supra note 208, at 772–73, 785–86. 
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use of CorpTech products with a pro-shareholder reputation could bring some 
gains in the form of higher stock prices.  
Consider, though, that a brand-building strategy is much more likely to pay 
off for standardized software tools than for tailored, firm-specific ones. In fact, 
the more firm-specific the CorpTech, the less credible the pro-shareholder signal 
sent by choosing a given CorpTech application. That is because management 
input for the development of the tailored code will be key. Correspondingly, the 
greater the coder’s specific investments in the relationship with an individual 
company, the weaker the signal of independence. For this reason, a brand-
building strategy is unlikely to work wherever the CorpTech’s added value 
comes from customization, as is arguably the case with most CorpTech 
applications. In fact, no two firms are alike; software developed for one firm will 
not work as well for others. 
In addition, similar to what has traditionally happened with audit firms and 
other gatekeepers, unless the governance of a firm’s (and its management’s) 
relationship with the supplier is effectively taken care of, there is a risk of 
collusion with managers, that is, a risk of deviation ex post from shareholders’ 
interests.210 Developing a reputation for producing good (shareholder-friendly) 
CorpTech would arguably be even harder than developing a reputation for 
providing good audit services, if only because there are, to date, no generally 
accepted coding standards that outsiders could use to understand what the coders 
have done. In addition, outside monitoring and review of algorithms is highly 
problematic.211  
The contractual governance point can be generalized to cast doubt on the 
ailing effects of product market discipline: competitors will have to sell products 
that the relevant decision-makers within corporations will find attractive. Unless 
such decision-makers’ incentives are fully aligned with the interests of 
shareholders, there is scope for suboptimal products to prevail on the market.  
But if full alignment is ensured, there will be no need for CorpTech. 
B.  BEST PRACTICES: EXPANDING THE BOARD COMMITTEES’ REMIT TO 
CORPTECH OVERSIGHT 
Information technology has traditionally been outside the board of 
directors’ remit: the selection and management of technological solutions has 
 
 210. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15–47 
(2006) (describing the failure of gatekeepers and their collusion with management in the early 2000s corporate 
scandals). 
 211. See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. 
Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 passim (2017) (arguing that research 
on AI review is in its infancy and that disclosure of results does not allow review of the underlying algorithm); 
see also Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 196–97, 202 
(2017) (arguing that code review does not result in desirable outcomes since the biases lie in broader social 
processes that cannot be countered by reviewing the code alone, but calling for code disclosure to let the public 
review the code outcome). 
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rather been, and still is, part of the executives’ domain.212 Banks represent an 
important exception here: with the ever-growing use of algorithms in risk 
management, banks increasingly ask their risk committees to review 
technology-related risks.213  
But even in non-financial corporations, where technology has typically 
been part of the oversight functions of the compliance or audit committee,214 
things are changing fast. With technology taking center stage both as a 
managerial and a governance tool, and with boards currently being composed 
mainly of individuals often lacking the competence to understand such 
aspects,215 more systematic oversight of technology on the part of a 
(independent) risk or audit committee is becoming more common.216  
Importantly, the practice of having tech committees, sometimes separate 
from risk management committees, sometimes as joint risk and technology 
committees, is spreading out,217 with cyber-attacks and IT-related operational 
risk representing their core focus on the technology side.218 To the best of our 
 
 212. See HÜTTER & RIEDL, supra note 162, at 11–12 (stating that Chief Information Officers (CIOs) either 
belong to the top management team or a department reporting to top management); see also Sid L. Huff, P. 
Michael Maher & Malcom C. Munro, Information Technology and the Board of Directors: Is There an IT 
Attention Deficit?, 5 MIS Q. EXEC. 55 passim (2006) (stating that boards are focused on IT risks only and that 
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decisions, IT leadership, IT functional structure, IT function effectiveness, and whether or not IT applications 
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Technology Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 313, 319 (2011). Morgan Stanley has 
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Conference, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015, 4:21 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/03/26/morgan-stanley-
board-pushes-emerging-area-of-tech-governance/. Tech advisory boards are becoming common outside the 
banking sector as well. See, e.g., Josh King, The Growth of Digital Advisory Boards, LINKEDIN (Jun. 2, 2016), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/growth-digital-advisory-boards-josh-king/ (“All types of firms, from start-ups 
and growth companies to Fortune 500 businesses and even PE/advisory firms, are developing these advisory 
boards.”). 
 214. Richard Nolan & F. Warren McFarlan, Information Technology and the Board of Directors, 83 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 96, 101 (2005). 
 215. Elizabeth Valentine & Glenn Stewart, Director Competencies for Effective Enterprise Technology 
Governance, in THE 24TH AUSTRALASIAN CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS 5 (2013), 
https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63374/ (highlighting the need for boards to provide enterprise technology governance 
oversight of technology-related strategy, investment and risk, and to be competent in doing so) (“[T]he gaps are 
large between the stated importance of business technology, actual board involvement . . . [and] knowledge and 
experience to effectively oversee technology strategy . . . .”); see also MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 119, at 48 
(detailing that approximately 45% of directors claim to have neutral or no competence on digitization, 49% on 
disruptive business models, and approximately 60% on cybersecurity in Exhibit 4). 
 216. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 213, at 319.  
 217. See Bankewitz et al., supra note 19, at 65. As of 2011, special board committees dealing with tech and 
cybersecurity were in place in less than 25% of organizations. Id. Bankewitz et al. expect that the “changing 
board agenda based on the shifts in organizational threats and opportunities may as well affect the committee 
structure of an organization,” resulting in a greater role for, and wider diffusion of, tech committees. Id. 
 218. Id. (“Main tasks of such a [tech] committee may be for instance to ratify that information systems 
architecture will support the strategies of the company to validate the effective use of data security tools to 
evaluate data breach response plans and to oversight the managements’ abilities to execute them.”); see also 
Julia L. Higgs, Robert E. Pinsker, Thomas J. Smith & George R. Young, The Relationship Between Board-Level 
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knowledge, however, tech committees are not in the business of monitoring the 
conflicts of interest inherent to CorpTech governance.219  
An extension of tech committees’ remit (or the remit of other board 
committees with the necessary tech knowledge in the ranks) to include 
CorpTech governance/oversight would seem to be a natural evolution in a tech-
augmented governance framework.220 Their extended focus should be on 
monitoring contract negotiations with coders, designing the governance of the 
contractual relationship with the coders, reviewing the design settings of crucial 
algorithms as well as, possibly, having a say on (internal) coders’ compensation.  
As with any governance tool, a board committee in charge of CorpTech 
oversight would be no silver bullet. Again, we can distinguish between 
technological limitations and governance’s inherent traits. One considerable 
challenge in terms of technological limitations is that, at least at the current stage 
of IT development, ex post review of the functions, limits, and biases of an 
algorithm is of limited effectiveness.221 Moreover, while independent directors 
themselves can work better than shareholders as monitors of management, 
including in overseeing management’s exercise of discretion when it comes to 
CorpTech, they are bound to suffer themselves from information asymmetries 
and imperfect incentives alignment.222  
As a corollary, putting an independent (tech) committee in charge of 
selecting CorpTech may sacrifice business efficiency in the name of conflict 
monitoring. In fact, in modern corporations, business operations depend on the 
efficiency of systems, while such efficiency depends, in turn, on accuracy as to 
process details. Meanwhile, given the elusive boundaries between CorpTech and 
operations IT,223 putting an independent (tech) committee in between 
management and tech deployment could slow down information transfer from 
management to coders. Oversight by an independent (tech) committee—rather 
than replacing management with independent directors in the task of managing 
a firm’s IT—seems to be a balanced solution.  
 
Technology Committees and Reported Security Breaches, 30 J. INFO. SYS. 79, 79–83 (2016) (arguing that tech 
committees are understood as part of the firm’s IT governance to signal the firm’s ability to detect and respond 
to security breaches).  
 219. Cf. Martin Lipton, Spotlight on Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 29, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/29/spotlight-on-boards-6/. While this widely circulated client alert 
memorandum refers to oversight risks arising, inter alia, from technological developments as one of the items 
boards are expected to focus on in 2020, oversight of CorpTech solutions is not mentioned as one such item. Id. 
 220. Cf. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 102 (similarly suggesting the setup of a committee of 
independent directors in charge of “data governance”). 
 221. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 222. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW 
AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 166, at 275, 316–20, 327–31 (describing independent directors’ time constraints, 
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 223. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
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C.  THE CASE AGAINST CORPTECH REGULATION 
Does the prospectively pervasive role of CorpTech in listed companies’ 
governance warrant any changes in the statutory law (state or federal) of 
corporations?  
We are hesitant to suggest so (with one exception laid out in the next 
Subpart, namely enhanced CorpTech governance disclosure). The main reason 
for being cautious and recommending a wait-and-see approach is that corporate 
governance practices are bound to change in the direction of sharpening the 
focus on CorpTech issues.224 It would be premature, and contrary to a long-
standing tradition in corporate governance reforms, to implement corporate 
governance-focused changes in state corporate statutes, federal securities 
regulation, or stock exchange listing rules before best practices have emerged 
on the market. Furthermore, corporate governance practices are firm-specific.  
Firms differ, for instance, in the extent to which they rely on their employees’ 
creativity, suppliers’ tailored inputs, intellectual property, and technology 
integration, among other factors. The downside of any prescriptive rule would 
be the risk of freezing much-needed experimentation in this area. 
This is particularly true for a CorpTech licensing regime:225 any licensing 
regime potentially limits innovation since innovators would focus on the 
development of permissible products only. Besides general concerns aired 
against public tech oversight,226 a licensing regime also raises the perennial issue 
of who would administer these rules.   
If authorization powers lie in public hands, we would expect supervisory 
expertise and resources to be limited, resulting in slow-motion supervision, 
while potential liability and the risk of reputational loss may skew incentives 
towards a timid, anti-innovative supervisory approach.227 Novel regulatory 
approaches, such as regulatory sandboxes,228 would deliver minor relief for 
CorpTech supervision. These tools assist where the core issue is both the 
innovators’ and supervisors’ shortage of expertise, time, and resources by 
providing a temporary safe space for examining the impact of an invention under 
almost real-time conditions and determining the adequate supervisory response.  
A sandbox approach for CorpTech, however, would provide little comfort for 
shareholders: it is far from clear that algorithms would show their true face in a 
 
 224. See supra Part IV.B. 
 225. As a form of private licensing, policymakers could impose liability insurance as a precondition for 
doing business where technology makes most business decisions such as in self-driving corporations or 
algorithmic entities. Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 18, at 112–13 (proposing a mandatory liability insurance 
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 226. See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 369, 370–
71 (2016) (stating that it has become difficult to define “what constitutes ‘normal’ economic activity and what 
qualifies as actual or potential harm” for society, firms and its shareholders and stakeholders). 
 227. Cf. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 248–49 
(2019) (arguing that innovation poses a challenge for regulators since regulators are expected to warrant financial 
innovation, simple rules and market integrity at the same time, with limited resources). 
 228. Steven Van Uytsel, Artifical Intelligence and Collusion: A Literature Overview, in ROBOTICS, AI AND 
THE FUTURE OF LAW 155, 175–77 (Marcelo Corrales, Mark Fenwick & Nikolaus Forgó eds., 2018) (discussing 
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sandbox.229 And, of course, the “learning” in machine learning does not stop 
with the final moment in the sandbox: any assessment achieved during the 
sandbox period would soon be outdated.  
If authorization powers lie, by way of indirect supervision, in private 
hands, the usual question of who watches the watchers takes the foreground.  
This question has been long and widely discussed, and rarely answered 
convincingly, in the similar context of auditors and rating agencies.230 Second, 
CorpTech licensing is compounded by an additional layer of IT complexity, 
turning IT audit into an emerging research field.231 The difficulties with code 
review are particularly pronounced for advanced machine-learning algorithms 
that receive feedback from non-human sources, for instance the price data feeds 
from stock and other markets. Technical means to review the function and 
limitations of self-learning algorithms do not yet exist.232  
D.  ENHANCING CORPTECH-RELATED DISCLOSURES 
Instead of product regulation, policymakers could require the disclosure of 
the CorpTech code. The case for disclosure would rest on the assumption that 
knowledgeable shareholders, market analysts, and traders would analyze the 
disclosures and trade on the basis of their analysis until the share price fully 
reflects the implications of those disclosures relative to the company’s 
profitability.233 Anticipating market scrutiny, management would have an 
incentive to choose good software. Applying this logic, external IT experts, 
whether individually or as a group, could undertake such code reviews on an 
experimental basis. The more experiments of this kind that are undertaken, the 
greater the likelihood of imperfect CorpTech solutions being exposed as such.  
In fact, in IT circles, crowdsourced testing has been acknowledged as a powerful 
analytical tool for detecting code deficiencies.234  
 
 229. See ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE 
ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 230–31 (2016) (arguing with respect to competition law that sandbox test results 
finding collusion and non-collusion of algorithms are notoriously unreliable). 
 230. See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 210, at 15–47 (2006) (describing the failure of gatekeepers and their 
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DUKE L.J. 711 (2006). 
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However, code disclosure will likely stifle innovation since it facilitates, if 
not encourages, the copying of the code; less investment in code development 
would follow. Furthermore, code disclosure is of no use where little, if any, firm-
specific data is available to crowd testers.235 Firms will not voluntarily disclose 
the data they process in algorithms, as disclosure may harm their 
competitiveness, contravene confidentiality duties, and/or infringe third party 
privacy rights.  
Given the increasing centrality of tech issues for corporate governance, one 
contiguous area where a change in the law could help is the disclosure of listed 
companies’ tech governance arrangements. As is the case with similar 
disclosures, for instance on internal controls and executive compensation,236 the 
dissemination of information about individual companies’ practices with regard 
to CorpTech oversight may help issuers become aware of better practices and 
further their adoption. The need to articulate CorpTech governance 
arrangements in disclosure documents, not to mention the risk of securities 
litigation regarding their contents, would also provide directors with the 
incentives to adopt appropriate CorpTech governance arrangements.237 Where 
disclosure shows that management and boards are lagging behind, 
shareholders—possibly themselves assisted by CorpTech that monitors tech-
related disclosures—may press for improvements.  
Existing periodic disclosures on corporate governance arrangements could 
thus be supplemented with additional explanations on, for instance, whether the 
issuer has a tech committee (or whether one of the other existing committees 
have CorpTech oversight functions), whether any of the board members are tech 
experts, how compensation for the coders is determined, how the board oversees 
code design, development, and upgrading, whether the board regularly engages 
in the review of existing IT structure, and so on. This could be part of annual 
disclosures mandated either by the Securities and Exchange Commission238 or 
the stock exchange listing rules.239  
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that CorpTech will have a significant impact on how 
corporate boards perform their functions: new technologies are in fact bound to 
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enhance boards’ effectiveness by improving the information collection and 
processing tools available to them. But, as this Article has argued, CorpTech 
will not replace boards.240 Neither will CorpTech significantly change what 
boards do, namely monitoring managers and mediating between them and the 
company’s shareholders and other stakeholders. That is because technology will 
not itself solve the agency problems characterizing corporations. The core 
insight of this Article is in fact that such agency problems cannot be coded away: 
those in control of the CorpTech will (continue to) control the corporation and 
therefore preserve their ability to engage in self-serving behavior. 
As building blocks of a governance framework for the CorpTech Age, we 
propose to tackle CorpTech manifestations of governance issues through rather 
traditional means, namely CorpTech board committees and disclosure of tech 
governance arrangements. These old-style, “analogue” tools, imperfect as they 
may be, can reduce the risk that CorpTech actually exacerbates agency problems 
within corporations by making it even easier for managers to pursue their own 
agenda. Only if and when humans relinquish corporate control to machines, may 
the problems at the core of corporate governance be solved, but by then humans 
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